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In the last two decades, many firms in the U.S. forest products industry have
either divested their timberlands or converted their corporate structures from C
corporations to real estate investment trusts (REITs). This study hypothesizes that this
large-scale timberland ownership change affects the financial performance of firms
involved in divestitures and on timber supply and, as a result, the economic surplus of
producers and consumers in the U.S. timber markets. These issues have not been
adequately addressed in existing literature. Event analysis and equilibrium displacement
models were employed to address firm financial performance in the capital markets and
welfare implications in U.S. timber markets, respectively. The capital markets responded
to divestiture events by significantly improving buying firms’ and REITs’ market value.
Annual average timberland ownership changes resulted in a net reduction of timber
supply which, in turn, caused total social surplus to decrease by $43 million on annual
rate of timberland ownership change basis. Compared to over $33 billion U.S. timber

markets, this surplus reduction was small. Thus, this study helps justify timberland
ownership change decisions and explains the nature and extent of surplus shifts among
producers and consumers when timberlands change hands.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Problems and Justification
There was an unprecedented change in industrial timberland ownership over the
past two decades in the United States. An estimated 28% of forest land changed hands in
the 1990s with much of it going entirely out of the ownership of vertically integrated
forest products companies (Best and Wayburn 2001). Over 18 million acres (ac) of
timberland was transacted from 1996 through 2004 in the U.S. South alone (Clutter et al.
2005). In 1992, the United States forest industry sector owned approximately 71 million
ac of timberland (NRC 1998). Industrial timberland ownership declined to 35.5 million
ac in 2004 (Harris 2007), 22 million ac in 2006 (Smith et al. 2010), 18.1 million ac in
2007 (Harris 2007), 17 million ac in 2008 and 14.7 million ac in 2010 (Forest2Market
2010).
On the other hand, investors significantly increased their investment in timberland
during this period. Bert and Laura (2009) reported that the global timberland market
value in 2006 was about $400 billion, of which the U.S. share was $230 billion. In the
U.S., timberland investments by private landowners, forest product companies and
institutional investors were $160 billion, $52 billion and $14 billion, respectively. Boyd
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(2006) and Mendell (2006) reported that nonindustrial investors’ timberland assets were
over $25 billion in 2005.
The primary sellers of timberland were the traditional vertically integrated forest
products companies and the largest identifiable group of buyers were nonindustrial
investors interested in timberland (Clutter et al. 2005). Nonindustrial investors typically
did not directly manage their investments; instead they hired professional asset managers
to oversee specific pieces of their portfolio. Typically, institutional investors hired
Timber Investment Management Organizations (TIMOs) to manage their timberland
investments. TIMOs buy, manage, and sell timberlands on behalf of institutional owners.
In addition to this new class of timberland managers, Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITs) were another emerging tax efficient entity owning timberland with the advantage
of eliminating double taxation plus achieving financial liquidity created by their publicly
traded securities (Kirk 2001).
Rogers and Munn (2003), Block and Sample (2001a), and Yin et al. (1998)
identified the driving factors inducing industrial corporate owners to sell their
timberlands as poor shareholder returns; debt reduction through the sale of timberland
assets; increased tax efficiency through more efficient tax structures such as TIMOs and
REITs, or subchapter S corporations; the development of tax strategies that minimize the
impact of large capital gains taxes (e.g. , installment notes or specific merger structures);
and shifting of capital to foreign timberlands. On the other hand, the primary reasons for
buying timberlands were favorable tax treatment for nonindustrial or institutional
investors and increased recognition within the financial community of the advantages of

2

timberland investments - favorable returns and low risk (Clutter et al. 2005; Hickman
2007).
This shift in forest land ownership has considerable economic, environmental, and
social consequences for forest products firms and timberland owners and consumers in
Mississippi, the Southeast U.S. and nationwide. Justification for undertaking this
research is that, the change of industrial timberland ownership not only affects forest
products firms, but also has great impacts on other forestry stakeholders. In fact, forestry
stakeholders encompass a large constituency that includes nonindustrial private forest
(NIPF) landowners; nonindustrial corporate timberland owners; public forest owners;
environmental and conservation groups; forest products firms and their associates like
workers, supplier and logging contractors and the forest products consumers. Given the
changing trend of timberland ownership, it is important to understand how this change
affects the performance of sellers and buyers in the capital markets, timber market
equilibria, and economic surplus of producers and consumers in the U.S. timber markets.
Only a few investigations have addressed the financial performance of individual
forest products firms in the U.S. forest product industry after their timberlands were
divested. Li and Zhang (2007) examined acreages of industrial timberlands owned by
major public forest products firms from 1988 to 2003 and concluded that forest product
firms with larger timberland holdings realized better financial performances when
compared to those with smaller land holdings. Greene and Kluender (1987) and Rinehart
(2001) found that a double tax burden was one of the important reasons for forest product
firm divestment. Yin et al. (1998) and Diamond et al. (1999) summarized industrial
historical timberland divestiture events. Several event studies (Choi and Russell 2004;
3

Mei and Sun 2008a; Pesendorfer 2003) examined the financial performance of forest
products firms involved in mergers and acquisitions. These studies concluded that capital
markets responded to mergers and acquisition events with an improvement of target firm
market performance.
Many studies were also carried out using General Equilibrium Models (GEMs)
and Equilibrium Displacement Models (EDMs) to determine timber market responses to
policy shocks and subsequent impacts on welfare shares of all parties involved in timber
markets. Numerous studies analyzed various issues related to taxation laws. For
example, Boyd and Daniels (1985) applied a GEM to examine income taxation in
forestry and found that welfare losses generated by the preferential capital gains
treatment of timber were much greater than previously imagined.
Some studies (Brown and Zhang 2005; Sun 2006; Sun and Kinnucan 2001;
Wagner et al. 1994) evaluated impacts of environmental regulations on forest
management, timber supply, and timber markets using EDMs. These studies reported
that environmental regulations caused a net decrease of economic surplus for landowners.
However, these studies did not consider nonmarket environmental benefits ensured by the
regulations which, if included, could otherwise offset these surplus losses. EDMs have
also been used to evaluate bilateral or international policy implications on U.S. timber
markets (Kinnucan and Zhang 2004; Li and Zhang 2006). No research has been
conducted to examine how industrial timberland transactions affect specific firm’s capital
market performance or how timberland ownership changes affect producer surplus,
consumer surplus and total surplus in U.S. timber markets. Thus a research need became
obvious to address these issues.
4

1.2 Objectives
This study focuses on impacts of timberland ownership change on the financial
performance of timberland owners, timber supplies and timber prices. Specifically, the
objectives are to: (1) determine impacts of industrial timberland ownership changes on
financial performance of selling firms, buying firms and REITs in capital markets; and
(2) evaluate welfare implications of timberland ownership changes in U.S. timber
markets.

5

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Timberland divestitures
The financial performance of the U.S. forest products industry, in terms of its
profit and risk, has been volatile in the last two decades. Many firms divested their
timberlands and some, such as Boise Cascade Corporation, and International Paper
Company, no longer own timberland (Best and Wayburn 2001; Harris et al. 2007).
Driving factors behind timberland divestitures were consolidation within the industry,
strategic restructuring to focus on product manufacturing due to a higher tax burden and
the shifting of capital towards foreign timberland purchases (Mendell 2007), poor
shareholder returns, and the need for debt reduction (Hickman 2007; Rogers and Munn
2003). Another important reason for selling timberlands was matured and stable U.S.
timber markets. Since industrial timberland owners had ensured timber supplies from
timber markets at competitive prices, the significance of internal timber supplies
declined. Thus, industrial owners were no longer motivated to retain timberlands (Harris
2007; Hickman 2007). Again, many firms believed that they could procure timber from
the divested lands more efficiently than by owning and managing them in-house. As a
result, these firms negotiated timber supply agreements with timberland buyers (Harris
2007).
6

In the U.S., International Paper Company, MeadWestvaco and Boise Cascade
Corporation made substantial timberland sales between 2004 and 2007. International
Paper Company, the largest seller, sold more than 9 million ac during this period (Harris
2007). Weyerhaeuser NR Company, on the contrary, sold little of its timberland, even
though the company was under pressure from its stockholders to sell its timberland
(Harris 2007). Ultimately, the company received shareholder approval to issue a
significant number of shares to enable the payout of its earnings and profits in
conjunction with its conversion to a REIT structure (Weyerhaeuser 2011).

2.2 Timberland investments
The most important timberland investor groups are TIMOs and REITs. The main
reasons for investing in timberland are favorable returns, low risk, a hedge against
inflation, large fund availability to TIMOs and REITs, and favorable tax treatment for
these landowners (Hickman 2007). The origin of the REIT system dates back to the
1880s. At that time, investors could avoid double taxation because trusts were not taxed
as a corporation if income was distributed to its beneficiaries. However, this tax
advantage was reversed in the 1930s, and all passive investments were taxed first at the
corporate level and later as a part of individual incomes. Unlike stock and bond
investment companies, REITs were unable to secure legislation to overturn the 1930
decision until 1960.
Following World War II, the demand for real estate funds skyrocketed and in
1960 a tax provision was signed which reestablished the special tax considerations for
REITs. This law has remained relatively intact with only minor changes since its
7

inception (REITnet 2009). REIT investments increased throughout the 1980s with the
elimination of certain real estate tax shelters. Investments in real estate provided
investors with income and appreciation. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 allowed REITs to
manage their properties directly, and, in 1993, REIT investment barriers to pension funds
were eliminated. This trend of reforms continued to increase the interest in, and value of,
REIT investment (REITnet 2009). The timber REITTs, beginning in the 1990s, enjoyed
much lower tax rates than the traditional forest product companies (Ginn 2005). Thus,
REITs became primary purchasers of timberlands that traditional paper companies and
other forest product manufacturing firms were putting up for sale (Hagan et al. 2005).
Between 1999 and 2006, four publicly traded REITs, Plum Creek Timber Company, Inc
(PCL), Rayonier, Inc. (RYN), Longview Fiber (LFB), and Potlatch Corporation (PCH),
converted over 12 million ac of timberland into REIT structures (Mendell 2007).
Unlike REITs, TIMOs did not own timberlands; they bought and managed
timberlands on behalf of their investors. These investors, like REITs, enjoy similar tax
advantages. Thus, TIMOs became one of the largest buyers of timberlands that the
industrial timberland owners were offering for sale. Timberland ownership under TIMOs
increased from 10.2 million acres in 2004 to 24.6 million acres by 2010. Total
timberland investment by REITs and TIMOs exceeded $25 billion by 2005 (Boyd 2006;
Mendell 2006) and $29 billion by 2007 (Harris 2007). After REITs and TIMOs,
conservation organizations formed the next most important investor group. Industrial
corporate owners sold about 37 million ac of timberland between 1981 and 2005. Of
this, 10 million ac were acquired by conservation groups (Boyd 2006; Hickman 2007).
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Large-scale industrial timberland transactions are presumed to have short-term
and long-term consequences. In the short run, timberland selling declarations might
affect a firm’s security returns almost immediately after the selling announcements are
made public. Since different landowners have different objectives for owning
timberlands, landownership changes are assumed to have long term consequences on
timber supplies. Environmental and conservation groups, for example, purchased
timberlands from industrial corporate owners to conserve environmental benefits rather
than for timber supply. This will, in turn, decrease timber supply to the U.S. timber
markets. While an event study may be convenient to catch the immediate reactions of
capital markets to the securities returns of timberland selling and buying firms, an EDM
may be used to determine the shifts in supplies and prices in timber markets.

2.3 Event studies
An event study assesses the immediate impacts of an external shock on the value
of a firm. It could also be broader than just the impact on a firm, such as the impact on
an economy, but usually an event study is associated with the impact of information on
the value of a firm (Seiler 2003). It is used in a variety of events including mergers and
acquisitions, earnings announcements, debt or equity issues, corporate re-organizations,
investment decisions, and corporate social responsibility (MacKinlay 1997; McWilliams
and Siegel 1997). There are many studies discussing methodologies of event studies.
Binder (1998) gave an account of event study methodologies used in academic arena
since 1969. This study proclaimed that event study methodology was introduced by
Fama et al. (1969). Binder (1998) explained the traditional event study method,
9

statistical power of event analysis, problem with the homoscedasticity assumption, and
ways to address heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional regressions. Engle (2001)
discussed the limitations of ordinary least square models and advocated for using
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models to address
volatility of economic data. Some event studies that used GARCH are Reyes (1999),
Wang et al. (2002), Medeiros and Matsumoto (2006), and Yamaguchi (2008).
The most crucial research-design issue in an event study is the length of the event
window (McWilliams and Siegel 1997). An event window is the number of trading days
preceding and following an event (announcement of timberland sale, for example) date
that are considered necessary to capture the impact of the event (Seiler 2003). Mei and
Sun (2008a) and Jin and Kim (2008) defined an event window as the day the event is
announced. It may even be as long as 20 days prior to and after the event day (Mei and
Sun 2008a). Brown and Warner (1985; 1980) showed that a long event window severely
reduces the power of the z statistic which ultimately leads to a false inference about the
event significance. It has been empirically demonstrated that a short event window can
capture the significant effect of an event since capital markets respond almost
immediately after the release of firm-specific information (Ryngaert and Netter 1990).
Dan et al. (1977) found that the market price of a stock reacts immediately and it fully
adjusts within 15 minutes when firm-specific information is made publicly available.
Mitchell (1989) found that stock prices reacted within 90 minutes of new wire stories
announcing proposed federal tax legislation. McWilliams and Siegel (1997) reported that
event windows in management studies have generally been larger and 181-day event
windows are not uncommon (Davidson et al. 1990). To resolve the issue of window
10

length, Ryngaert and Netter (1990) argued that the event window should be long enough
to capture the significance of the event but short enough to exclude confounding effects.
However, there is no set number of trading days to be included in the event window. It is
a matter of judgment for the researchers based on the type of event being studied (Seiler
2003).
Apart from studies on event study methodology, there are numerous event studies
on specific issues. Mei and Sun (2008a) conducted a traditional event study on the
financial performance of the U.S. forest product industry attributed to mergers and
acquisitions. Choi and Russell (2004) and Pesendorfer (2003) also carried out similar
studies on firm mergers and acquisitions. These studies reported that, capital market
responded to mergers and acquisition with an improvement of target firm financial
performance. Mendell et al. (2008) carried out an event analysis and reported that capital
markets responded positively to forest products firm conversion declarations to REITs.
Chen et al. (2007) conducted an event study to evaluate the effect of severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreaks on the stock market performance of Taiwanese
residential hotels. Jin and Kim (2008) carried out a traditional event study to evaluate the
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak on the stock market performance of
U.S. agribusiness and food processing firms.

2.4 Tax law, timber supply, and timber income
A number of studies examined welfare impacts due to regulations like the 1986
Tax Reform Act (TRA), the 1976 National Forest Management Act, the 1991 federal
district court ruling banning timber sales on national forests to conserve northern spotted
11

owls. Previous studies (Daughtrey et al. 1987) analyzed various issues related to
taxation laws. Greene and Kluender (1987) assessed the possible effect of the TRA on
forest income. Using a computer simulated model they concluded that timber income for
private forest landowners would decline by as much as 10.6% under the TRA.
Dangerfield and Gunter (1991) evaluated the long-term effects of the TRA on
timber supply by noncorporate timberland owners in the U.S. South. They reported that
some marginal producers, unable to become more efficient, may exit the industry due to
the TRA provisions. Siegel et al. (1996) investigated the combined impacts of federal
and state taxation laws on timber incomes in 19 U.S. states in the Northeast and
Northwest and reported that the TRA significantly affected many state income laws, due
to most states adopting some or all of federal income tax provisions, and state income
taxes were substantial components of total tax liability in those states with a
comprehensive personal income tax. The constantly changing federal and state income
tax laws made NIPF income tax planning more complex and burdensome than prior to
passage of the TRA. A similar study was carried out by Smith et al. (2007) on 23 states
in the U.S. Midwest and Northeast that reported similar impacts of the TRA.

2.5 Equilibrium Displacement Models (EDMs)
EDMs have been widely used in addressing law and policy issues pertaining to
conservation, management, and uses of natural resources. In addition, they are powerful
tools used for economic analyses. These models consist of a system of reduced form
equations that express relative changes in endogenous variables as linear functions of
structural elasticities and relative changes in exogenous variables (Sun 2008). Some
12

important applications of EDMs evaluating natural resource policy and programs are
presented here.

2.5.1 Evaluating environmental regulations
Many studies were carried out using EDMs to determine the economic shocks
caused by environmental regulations on timber markets. Boyd and Daniels (1985) used a
GEM to show that welfare losses generated by the preferential capital gains tax treatment
of timber were much greater than previously imagined. Wagner et al. (1994) investigated
the economic impacts of federal, state, and local environmental regulations on the
southern U.S. softwood stumpage market. They reported that southern timber producers
were net beneficiaries of environmental regulations in the United States. Sun and
Kinnucan (2001) considered this conclusion as biased because the environmental
regulations cause the supply curve to shift up and an upward shift in supply decreases
welfare. They showed that environmental regulations imposed a significant cost on the
South’s forestry sector. However, they also reported that an improved environment
might well offset these losses.
Sun (2006) has used a Muth-type (Muth 1964) EDM to evaluate the timber
harvesting and marketing related welfare loss borne by landowners, loggers, and forest
product mills resulting from forestry best management practices (BMPs) both in the
lumber and paper sectors of the United States. Consumers had the highest absolute
welfare loss and second largest loss in relative welfare because they were especially
sensitive to imperfect timber market competition in the forest products industry. This
study evaluated the surplus losses caused only by the reduction of timber harvesting due
13

to BMPs. The overall impacts of BMPs might otherwise be welfare increasing if
nonmarket environmental benefits were included in the study.

2.5.2 Evaluating forest certification programs
Like environmental regulations, forest certification programs impacted
management and uses of forest resources. Although these programs are voluntary,
timberland owners do adopt them to deliver their environmental responsibility and to
enhance their social acceptability. Brown and Zhang (2005) used an EDM to measure
the surplus changes for timber producers and consumers in the U.S. South caused by the
Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI). SFI, for example, limits clear-cut sizes and restricts
harvests along roadsides or riversides. SFI-compliance thus reduced timber supplies and
increased timber prices. While the producer surpluses for government and non-SFI firms
increased for increased timber price, consumers and SFI-compliant firms faced reduced
economic surpluses. This study also did not consider the higher market prices for
certified timber products and environmental benefits attributable to forest certification
programs.

2.5.3 Evaluating international trade agreements
EDM has been also used to evaluate bilateral or international policy implications
on U.S. timber markets. Kinnucan and Zhang (2004) reported that 63% of the 1996
Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Agreement’s exports were absorbed by Canadian
consumers and the rest by U.S. consumers. The higher export tax raised Canada’s
welfare and lowered that of the U.S. Li and Zhang (2006) evaluated the impacts of the
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1996 U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement on lumber manufacturers, loggers, and
timberland owners. Landowners were the greatest beneficiary of this agreement with
46% of the total welfare share. Lumber manufacturers captured 40% and loggers, 14%.
Wiseman and Sedjo (1981) used a Marshallian Demand model to examine welfare
implications of a hypothetical embargo of softwood log exports from the U.S. Pacific
Coast region and showed that prohibition of log exports would result in a substantial
reduction in lumber price and welfare within the United States.

2.6 Research gap
While many studies have examined the extent of timberland transactions, benefits
of retaining timberlands, and mergers and acquisitions, no studies were carried out to
examine the immediate impacts of timberland transaction (i.e., both selling and buying)
announcements on selling and buying firm performance in the capital markets. This
study is an attempt to examine the financial performance of these firms in the capital
markets immediately after the announcement of timberland transactions. It also examines
the change in the standardized risk of firms involved in transactions, and compares firm
financial performance when selling or buying timberlands or converting to REIT
structures.
Large-scale timberland ownership change has long-term consequences as well.
The primary objective of owning timberlands by environmental groups is not timber
production and it will certainly result in a net reduction of timber supplies. Also, some
timberlands near developing areas will be converted to higher and better uses (HBUs)
such as house building or urban sprawling. This permanent reduction in the timberland
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base will also lead to a reduction in timber supplies. There is no study that addressed this
two-way timber supply reduction issue. This study estimates the change of economic
surpluses for timber producers and consumers due to timberland ownership change and
evaluates the total social surplus loss due to net reduction of timber supplies in the U.S.
timber markets.
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CHAPTER III
IMPACTS OF INDUSTRIAL TIMBERLAND TRANSACTIONS AND REITCONVERSIONS ON THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF
U.S. FOREST PRODUCTS FIRMS

3.1 Introduction
In 2002, the U.S. forest products industry produced shipments close to $319
billion in value. About 1.63 million employees were rendering their services in this
industry (Bureau of Census 2006). Although the shipment size increased to $363 billion
in 2007, the number of employee declined to 1.45 million with an annual payroll of about
$55.9 billion (Bureau of Census 2009). Despite this reduction, the forest products
industry plays a significant role in U.S. economy.
Forest industry in the U.S. owned about 71 million ac of timberland in 1992,
which was almost 10% of the nation’s forest land (NRC 1998). An estimated 28% of this
timberland changed hands in the 1990s with much of it going entirely out of ownership
by vertically integrated forest products companies (Best and Wayburn 2001). An
increasingly important role was played by relatively new and rapidly growing class of
corporate structures known as TIMOs and REITs. TIMOs buy, manage, and sell
timberlands on behalf of institutional investors (Block and Sample 2001b). A REIT is a
company that owns, and in most cases, develops, manages and sells income-producing
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real estate such as apartments, shopping centers, offices, hotels and timberlands
(NAREIT 2009). Stock shares of REITs can be traded on major global stock exchanges
of the United States. To qualify as a REIT, a company must have most of its assets and
income tied to real estate investment and must distribute annually at least 90% of its
taxable income to its shareholders. Table 3.1 summarizes the pre-requisites for a firm
wishing to convert to a REIT.

Table 3.1 Necessary criteria required by the Internal Revenue Service for a firm to
qualify as a real estate investment trust (REIT).
Criteria

Measures

1 Business structures

Taxable corporation or trust

2 Managed by

A board of directors or trustees

3 Share status

Fully transferable

4 Number of shareholders

≥ 100

5 Annual payment in shareholder dividends

≥ 90% of taxable income

6 Holding limit of shares during the last half of each tax

≤ 50% by five or fewer

year

individuals

7 Portion of assets in the form of real estate

≥ 75%

8 Portion of assets in the form of stock of taxable REIT

≤ 20%

subsidiaries
9 Major source of income

≥ 75% from rents or mortgage
interest

Source: NAREIT (2009).

Four publicly traded REITs namely Plum Creek Timber Company, Inc., Rayonier,
Inc., Longview Fiber and Potlatch Corporation converted over 12 million ac of
timberland to REIT structures between 1999 and 2006 (Mendell et al. 2007). A summary
of these four publicly traded timber REITs is presented in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2 REIT announcement dates and firm level financial summary of the publicly
traded timber REITs in the United States.
Timber REITs

REITs since Year Timberland

Plum Creek Timber Company, Inc. 06-08-1998

Rayonier, Inc.

Longview Fiber

Potlatch Corporation

08-19-2003

07-27-2005

09-19-2005

TR a

NI b

TA c

CFC d

DS e
($)

(Mil ac)

(Mil $) (Mil $) (Mil $)

(Mil $)

2008

7.40

1614.00 233.00 4781.00

129.00 1.68

2007

8.00

1675.00 282.00 4664.00

-33.00 1.68

2006

8.20

1627.00 317.00 4661.00

-96.00 1.60

2008

2.60

1232.10 152.00 2091.00 -119.40 2.00

2007

2.60

1171.48 174.00 2079.00

2006

2.20

1121.54 176.00 1965.00 -106.10 1.88

2006

0.59

0950.67

18.98 1137.12

1.10 0.65

2005

0.57

0898.09

10.35 1211.70

-0.70 0.06

2004

0.58

0831.17

13.90 1270.93

1.60 0.04

2008

1.60

0439.96

52.64

938.32

-8.16 2.04

2007

1.50

0423.47

56.43 1517.20

1.29 1.98

2006

1.50

0417.24 139.10 1457.61

1.63 17.3

140.91 1.94

Source: NAREIT (2009) and the 2008 Annual Reports of the concerned companies on
the form 10-K of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); a Total revenue; b net
income; c total assets, d cash flow changes; e dividend per share.

Many forest products firms either divested their timberlands or converted to REIT
structure. Many major firms such as Boise Cascade Corporation and International Paper
Company no longer own any timberland (Harris et al. 2007). Ownership of most
industrial timberland has shifted from industrial corporate landowners to TIMO investors,
REITs, conservation organizations, and other private timberland owners (Best and
Wayburn 2001). The driving factors for industrial timberland owners to sell timberlands
and convert to REIT structures were consolidation within the industry, strategic
restructuring to focus on production manufacturing due to a higher tax burden, and
shifting of capital towards foreign timberland purchases (Ginn 2005).
A REIT is permitted to deduct dividends paid to its shareholders from its
corporate taxable income. As a result, most REITs remit 100% of their taxable income to
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their shareholders and, therefore, owe no corporate taxes. Taxes are paid by shareholders
on the dividends they receive and on any capital gains. Most states do not require REITs
to pay state income tax (NAREIT 2009). Beginning in the 1990s, these structures
enjoyed much lower tax rates than the traditional forest products firms (Ginn 2005).
Thus, both TIMOs and REITs became the primary purchasers of timberlands that
traditional forest products companies were putting up for sale (Hagan et al. 2005). Major
industrial timberland divestiture in the U.S. from 1986 to 2007 is presented in Table 3.3.
For each event, date of event, selling party, buying party, ac of land transacted, and their
costs were recorded.
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Table 3.3 Major timberland transaction events in the United States from 1986 through
2007.
Date a

Selling party

Buying party

Payment (Million $) Area (ac)

09-04-1986 Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corporation Louisiana-Pacific Corporation

315

650,000

10-13-1987 Sierra Pacific Industries

Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corporation

ND b

520,000

10-22-1993 Potlatch Corporation

Not identified

50

47,350

09-26-1995 Fiberboard Corporation

Sierra Pacific Industries

245

76,000

11-28-1995 Weyerhaeuser NR Company

Roseburg Forest Products Company

303

600,000

02-28-1996 Hanson, PLC

Weyerhaeuser NR Company

500

661,200

03-06-1996 IP Timberlands, Ltd.

R-H Timber Company

905

300,000

03-12-1996 Hanson, PLC

Willamette Industries

1,590

1,000,000

07-23-1996 Weyerhaeuser NR Company

U.S. Timberlands Company, LP

309

600,000

08-07-1996 River wood International Corporation

Plum Creek Timber Company, Inc.

540

538,000

12-17-1996 Kimberly-Clark Corporation

Alliance Forest Products

600

ND b

12-26-1996 Georgia-Pacific Corporation

Sierra Pacific Holding Company

320

127,000

02-17-1997 James River Corporation

Hancock Timber Resource Group

110

95,000

08-04-1997 International Paper Company

Forest Investment Associates

200

175,000

09-15-1997 Trillium Corporation

Crown Pacific, LP

153

65,000

03-10-1998 IP Timberlands, Ltd.

IP Forest Resources Company

99.5

ND b

10-06-1998 Sappi, Ltd. (North America)

Plum Creek Timber Company, Inc.

180

905,000

10-22-1998 Bowater, Inc.

J. D. Irving, Ltd.

220

1,000,000

11-02-1998 Bowater, Inc.

McDonald Investment Company

155

656,000

11-16-1998 Willamette Industries

Campbell Group international

234

117,000
b

529,000

01-06-1999 Kimberly-Clark Corporation

South-Star Timber Resources

ND

03-04-1999 Seven Islands Land Company

New England Forestry Foundation

ND b

754,673

06-09-1999 Boise Cascade, LLC

U.S. Timberlands Company, LP

60

56000

06-10-1999 Kimberly-Clark Corporation

Joshua Management, LLC

400

460,000

07-02-1999 Champion International Corp.

Conservation Fund

76.2

271,000

07-30-1999 Smurfit-Stone Container Corporation

Rayonier, Inc.

725

1,000,000

10-13-1999 Alliance Forest Products International

John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. 310

372,000

11-01-1999 Timber Company, Georgia-Pacific

Hawthorne Timber Company

397

194,000

10-23-2001 Bowater, Inc.

Alliance Forest products, Inc.

230

264,000

12-15-2003 Weyerhaeuser NR Company

Forest Investment Associates

140

160,000

04-04-2006 International Paper Company

private timberland investment firms

5,100

5,100,000

08-06-2007 Temple Inland

Campbell Group, Inc.

1,100

1,550,000

09-12-2007 Western Pacific Timber, LLC

Potlatch Corporation

215

179,000

a

The date of divestiture announcement- actual transaction might or might not take place
on the date; b not disclosed on the day of divestiture announcement.

There are numerous studies that addressed the history and chronology of
timberland transactions in the U.S. Li and Zhang (2007) examined acreages of industrial
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timberlands owned by major publicly traded forest products firms from 1988 to 2003 and
concluded that timberland holdings are positively related to the financial performance of
these firms. Greene (1987) and Rinehart (2001) reported that a double tax burden pushed
many forest products firms to divest their timberlands. Mei and Sun (2008a) conducted a
traditional event study on the financial performance of U.S. forest products industry due
to mergers and acquisitions and reported that target firm financial performance
significantly improved due to mergers and acquisitions. Choi and Russell (2004) carried
out a similar study and reported that capital market responded to mergers and acquisitions
in the U.S. forest products industry and improved the financial performance of the target
firms. In another event study, Pesendorfer (2003) examined the impacts of mergers and
acquisitions in the U.S. paper and paperboard industry and reported that the financial
efficiency of most acquiring firms improved after an acquisition event.
Mendell et al. (2007) explained three basic ways (i.e., sell-off, TIMOs and REITs)
to invest in timberlands. They also compared financial data of publicly traded timber
REITs and C corporations. Mendell et al. (2008) further conducted an event study and
discussed the investor responses to timberlands structures such as REITs and concluded
that, capital markets reacted to REIT-announcements with financial improvement of
REITs as a group. NAREIT (2009) maintains a directory that contains most REITrelated information. It contains a comprehensive REIT-directory and discusses emerging
history of REITs, their legal status, and investment opportunities. Udpa (2007) broadly
explained why and how firms switched from C corporations to REITs and reported that,
due mainly to avoid higher tax burden, industrial timberland owners switched to REIT
structures. Deweese (2005), reported on the history of timber REITs. Problems
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confronting paper manufacturers and their struggles to boost up their share prices in
equity markets were also explained in the report.
While several studies covered the history and chronology of timberland
transaction events, there have not been enough investigations that rigorously addressed
the after-effects of industrial timberland transactions and REIT conversion
announcements on specific firms in U.S. forest products industry. No specific
investigation into whether selling, buying, or REIT-conversion of timberlands are better
options for forest products firms to boost their financial performance in capital markets
have been conducted. Thus, examining the impacts of industrial timberland transactions
and forest product firm conversions from C Corporations to REITs on their financial
performance was warranted. The study objective was to evaluate the impact of U.S.
forest products firm timberland transactions and conversions to REITs on their financial
performance from 1986 to 2007, the period that most industrial timberland divestiture
events took place.

3.2 Empirical methods
An event study is a method to assess the impact of an event on the value of a firm.
The basic idea is to find the abnormal return attributable to the event of interest by
adjusting for the return that stems from the price fluctuation of the market as a whole.
Event studies have been used in a large variety of studies, including those looking at
mergers and acquisitions, earnings announcements, debt or equity issues, corporate reorganizations, investment decisions, and corporate social responsibility (MacKinlay
1997; McWilliams and Siegel 1997).
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3.2.1 Event and event window
The first stage in an event study includes several generic stages such as defining
an event of interest and identifying the period over which the event impact is examined.
Events of interest in this study were major transactions of industrial timberlands of U.S.
forest product firms from 1986 to 2007. Possibly, the most crucial research-design issue
in an event study is the length of the event window (McWilliams and Siegel 1997). An
event window is the number of trading days preceding and following an event date that
are considered necessary to capture the impact of the event (Seiler 2003). Brown and
Warner (1985) showed that using a long event window severely reduces the power of the
test statistic z , which ultimately leads to a false inference about the event’s significance.
Ryngaert and Netter (1990) argued that, a short event window can capture the
significant effect of an event. Dan et al. (1977) found that the market price of a stock
fully adjusts within 15 minutes when the firm-specific information is publicly released
while Mitchell (1989) found that stock prices reacted within 90 minutes of new wire
stories announcing proposed federal tax legislation. McWilliams and Siegel (1997)
reported further that event windows in corporate management studies have generally
been larger and 181-day event windows are not uncommon (Davidson et al. 1990). Mei
and Sun (2008a) and Jin (2008) defined an event window as the day the event is
announced. It may even be as long as 20 days prior to and after the event day (Mei and
Sun 2008a).
The length of the event window should be long enough to capture the event’s
significance, but short enough to exclude its confounding effects. The nature of the event
being studied should determine the length of the event window (Ryngaert and Netter
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1990). It is traditional to define the event window to be larger than the specific event
date to avoid a potential bias due to thin trading and to permit an examination of
abnormal returns surrounding the event day (Jin and Kim 2008; MacKinlay 1997).
While there are different opinions concerning the length of an event window, it
should be selected such that the event analysis can accurately address the effects of the
event being studied. Recent studies on timberland transactions selected window lengths
ranging from one day to 11 days (Mendell et al. 2008), three days to 15 days (Mei and
Sun 2008a). In this study, six window lengths were selected. The smallest event
window, a three day event window, picks up the immediate impacts of the event
announcements and subsequent windows examine persistence of abnormal return to firm
securities. The six event windows (t1 , t2 ) chosen were as follows:
(1,  1), (3,  3), (6,  6), (9,  9), (12,  12), (15,  15) . The length of the event

window, T , was defined as t2  t1  1; where, t1 is the number of days prior to the event
date and t2 is the number of days after the event. Thus, the total number of days in the six
event windows was 3, 7, 13, 19, 25 and 31, respectively.
After defining event window lengths, the length of the estimation window was
determined. Number of trading days preceding the event date constitutes the estimation
window. The length of the estimation window in event analysis is critical because it
explains the trend of returns to a firm’s security. If the event under study results in an
abnormal return to the firm security, its security returns trend is displaced and it either
rises or falls from the original trend. In this study, the estimation window covered 250
trading days before the event took place. Similarly, the days after the event constitute the
post event window. The length of the post event window is also critical because it
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exhibits the persistence of the abnormal returns and measures firm systematic risks after
the event has taken place. Three post event windows, 50 days, 100 days and 200 days,
were selected in this study.

3.2.2 Abnormal returns for individual firm
Abnormal returns on a firm’s securities are the differences between its actual
returns and normal returns over a predefined estimation window. Normal returns are the
expected returns had the event not occurred. There are two popular models that deal with
expected returns or benchmark returns: the constant mean model and the market model.
The former assumes that expected returns on the security of a firm are constant varying
across firms (Brown and Warner 1985; Brown and Warner 1980) while the latter
specifies a stable linear relationship between market returns and the firm’s security
returns. In this study, the market model was used to calculate abnormal returns:
Rit

Di  Ei Rmt  H it

[3.1]

where, t is a day over a predefined estimation window; Rit is the return of firm i on day

t ; Rmt is the return of a market portfolio on day t ; D i and E i are the parameters to be
estimated; H it is the error term assumed i.i.d ~ N (0, V 2 ) . The value-weighted S&P 500
Composite Index was chosen as the proxy of the market portfolio.
After estimating Di and Ei through ordinary least squares, the abnormal returns,
Ait of firm i on day

t over an event window was calculated using equation (3.2).
Ait

Rit  (Dˆi  Eˆi Rmt )
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[3.2]

Under the null hypothesis, that the event has no impact on the firm’s securities returns,
Ait possesses a normal distribution (MacKinlay 1997). In actual estimation, Ait is just

the predicted residual of the market model on an out-of-sample basis (Mei and Sun
2008a).
Cumulative abnormal returns, CiT for firm i was obtained by aggregating
abnormal returns, Ait over T day event window using equation (3.3).
T

CiT

¦A

it

[3.3]

t 1

According to Medeiros and Matsumoto (2006), when the estimation window is
sufficiently large, the variance of CiT can be asymptotically measured using equation
(3.4), given the Central Limit Theorem:
Var (CiT ) TV H2it

[3.4]

where, T is the length of the event window and V H2it is the variance of the disturbance
term in the market model. CiT has a normal distribution and the null hypothesis that the
expected value of CiT is zero can be examined following MacKinlay (1997).

3.2.3 Abnormal returns across all firms
Following Mei and Sun (2008a), the average cumulative abnormal returns for
individual firms can be aggregated across firms when many events are studied together.
This is necessary because tests with multiple events are more convincing than with a
single event. One way to examine the overall impact of multiple events in an industry is
to calculate the average cumulative abnormal returns using equation (3.5).
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CNT

1
N

N

¦C

[3.5]

iT

i 1

where, CNT is the average cumulative abnormal returns for N firms as a group over a T day event window. According to equation (3.5), for N firms and T -day event window,
there is only one point estimate of CNT . Substituting equation (3.3) into (3.5) yields:

CNT

1 N § T
·
Ait ¸
¦
¦
¨
N i 1©t 1 ¹

[3.6]

Equation (3.6) can be rewritten as follows:

[3.7]

where, H NG is the average cumulative abnormal returns for N firms up to G day over the
event window and G [1, T ] . H NG has an estimate for each specific day in the event
window and H NG equals CNT when G approaches T . MacKinlay (1997) suggests for a
graphical representation of H NG to visually inspect the trend of average cumulative
abnormal returns on every successive day of a specific event window.
With the assumption of asymptotically normal distribution, the variance of the
average cumulative abnormal returns for the sample firm can be calculated using
equation (3.8) and its statistical significance can be examined by z-statistic using equation
(3.9).
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Var (CNT )

1
N2

z

N

¦Var (C

iT

)

[3.8]

i 1

CNT
~ N (0,1)
Var (CNT )

[3.9]

This distribution result is asymptotic when the estimation window is enough large
(Medeiros and Matsumoto 2006; Mei and Sun 2008a) and a large number of firms are
involved in the study (Campbell et al. 1997).

3.2.4 Cross-sectional regression
When comparing a firm’s financial ratios to industry ratios, it may not be suitable
to use the average industry value when there is wide non-symmetric dispersion of
individual firm ratios within the industry. In this situation, a cross-sectional analysis may
be appropriate, where an individual firm can be compared to a subset of firms within the
industry that are comparable in size and characteristics (Andrews 2005).
After determining the significance of the average cumulative abnormal returns, in
a second stage of the analysis, the average cumulative abnormal returns can be further
analyzed by showing the cross-sectional variation in the return across firms. Thus, the
average cumulative abnormal returns should be regressed on some measures of firm
diversification such as return on assets and transaction size (McWilliams and Siegel
1997). The average cumulative abnormal returns give an overview of how firms behave
after the news of an event is leaked out. But cross-sectional regression links average
cumulative abnormal returns to factors affecting firms having abnormal returns.
According to Mei and Sun (2008a), the association between magnitudes of average
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cumulative abnormal returns and characteristics specific to the event observations can
provide additional insights on the determinants of average cumulative abnormal returns.
The average cumulative abnormal returns were explained by several financial
attributes of the firms involved in the events of interest, that is, industrial timberland
transactions. Event analysis examines the impacts of an announcement on a firm’s
financial attributes. This study hypothesized that, whether a firm decided to divest all its
timberland or a part of it had different financial implications. Again, the nature and
extent of average cumulative abnormal returns might be impacted by the age of an event,
i.e., the time difference between now and when the event actually took place. Another
criterion considered here was firm’s return on assets. This attribute explains how
profitable a firm is. It also highlights a firm’s management efficiency. Thus, returns on
asset can have an impact on its daily stock return. The size of the money transacted
relative to its total assets is another factor that contributes to a firm’s performance in the
capital markets. This study also assumes that the performance of the buying and selling
firms would be different. Finally, a bigger transaction, one billion dollar or above in this
study, might also influence a firm’s financial performance in the capital market.
Based on all these factors, the following cross sectional regression was specified
with six explanatory variables to explain the response variable, that is, average
cumulative abnormal returns.
CiT

E0  E1 ( ALLi )  E2 (TIMEi )  E3 (ROAi )  E4 (SIZEi )  E5 ( PARTYi )  E6 (TRANi )  Pi

[3.10]

where, CiT is the average cumulative abnormal return for firm i over T -day event
window; E s are the regression coefficients. Three dummy variables were defined to
differentiate events under investigation- ALL ,

PARTY
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and TRAN . The variable

ALL

equaled one when the forest product firm ݅ sold all its timberlands and zero otherwise.
PARTY

equaled one for a buying firm and zero for a selling firm. One was assigned to

TRAN when the transaction fund was $1 billion or above and zero otherwise. The time

trend variable

TIME

was the number of years between 2006 and the year of divestiture

announcement in the Wall Street Journal or New York Times. ROA was the return on
assets of firm i , SIZE was the ratio of the transaction size of the event in million U.S.
dollars to the total asset value of firm ݅ in million U.S. dollars and Pi is the mean zero
error term with constant variance.

3.2.5 Risk analysis
In capital markets, firm securities are risky assets. Thus, risk assessment is an
integral part of any event study. A comparison of the statistical estimates of systematic
risk, before and after the divestiture event of interest, can be supplementary to the
analysis of abnormal returns. Following MacKinlay (1997) and Mei and Sun (2008a),
four lengths were employed for pre- and post-event risk analysis: 50, 100, 150, and 200
days.
Jensen (1969) employed the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to measure
systematic risk by following statistical specification:
Rit  R ft

Di  Ei Rmt  R ft \ i

[3.11]

where, Rit is the realized return at time t on asset i , Rmt is the realized return at time t of
the market portfolio m and R ft is the return on the three-month T-bills (a risk free asset)
at time t . The parameter E i is termed as asset i ’s beta and can be viewed as a
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standardized measure of systematic risk (Reilly and Brown 1997). The error term \ i has
a normal distribution with mean zero, constant variance, and serial independence.
Following Mei and Sun (2008a), a dummy variable, Di was incorporated to
determine the difference in beta values for an individual firm before and after transaction
events. Variable Di equaled one on and after the day of the event announcement and
zero for the days before. Coefficient of the interaction term was J i that captured the
state of change in firm i ’s systematic risk after the event.
Rit  R ft

Di  Ei Rmt  R ft  J i Di ( Rmt  R ft ) \ i

[3.12]

3.3 Data sources
The divestiture announcement database was not available in a single source. To
create a timberland transaction database, the first step was to search through three online
databases: LexisNexis Academic, Newspaper Source, and Academic Search Premier. All
online issues of the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times from 1986 to 2007 were
rigorously searched for any announcement of timberland divestiture. Yin et al. (1998)
and Diamond et al. (1999) compiled timberland divestiture events. Anon (2009) also
summarized a number of industrial timberland transactions in the U.S. South and beyond.
For each event, five items were recorded: announcement date, selling firms, buying firms,
total money transacted in million U.S. dollars, and total area of timberland transacted in
ac. The transaction events thus obtained are presented in Table 3.3.
Daily stock returns of firms were collected directly from the database of the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The date range of daily stock return data
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for all firms was January 1, 1980 to December 31, 2008. While some firms had daily
return data for the entire date range, some firms only had daily return data for several
years within this date range. The value-weighted S&P 500 Composite Index was used as
the proxy of the market portfolio. The Daily returns of this Index from January 1, 1985
to December 31, 2008 were also collected from the CRSP database.
For cross-sectional analysis, information regarding a firm’s return on assets, total
assets and net income were collected from the COMPUSTAT database. These were the
fiscal year end data preceding the divestiture event announcement. For a risk assessment
of firms involved in timberland divestitures, the market rate of 3 month U.S. T-bills
(Federal Reserve Bank 2009) was used as the rate of risk free returns. Data related to
REITs were collected from the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trust
(NAREIT) and Annual Reports of the REITs under study from the 10-K form the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the years 2006 through 2008.

3.4 Empirical results

3.4.1 Abnormal returns
Estimation of all models used in this chapter was carried out by statistical
software package R 2.12.1 and the detailed R-codes are given in Appendix B. The
average cumulative abnormal returns, H NG on specific days in the 31-day event window
for the 33 timberland transaction events are presented in Figure 3.1. The values of H NG
were calculated for 15 days prior to, on the day of, and 15 days after, the transaction
announcements. On the last day of the event window (i.e., on the 31st day of the window)
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H NG equaled CNT . Figure 3.1 depicts how buying and selling firms behaved just before,

on the day of, and immediately after timberland transaction announcements were made
public. On an average, the news of the transactions leaked out in the market five days
prior to formal announcement of the transactions. While both selling and buying firms
had showed similar financial patterns before the transaction news leaked out, their
financial patterns differentiated from each other after it.
After the transaction news leaked out, the average cumulative abnormal returns
rose for buying firms until the 27th day of the 31-day event window and then continued
falling until the last day of the window. On the other hand, the selling firm’s
performance was rather volatile. Their average cumulative abnormal returns fell
immediately after the news of the sales leaked out, then again started rising from the 21st
day of the event window. However, although it showed a zigzag pattern, it had relatively
a horizontal trend with no significant abnormal returns. The rising rate of average
cumulative abnormal returns for buying firms was higher than the falling rate of average
cumulative abnormal returns for selling firms. While average cumulative abnormal
returns lines for buying and selling firms moved in opposite directions, average
cumulative abnormal returns line for the combined group ran in between these two lines.
Buying firm gains being larger than selling firm losses in the capital market, the
combined line showed a mild upward sloping trend.
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Figure 3.1 Average cumulative abnormal returns ( H NG ) over the 31-day event window
obtained in ordinary least squares for 33 timberland transactions from 1986
to 2007 in the United States. Zero (0) on the horizontal line indicates event
date.

Table 3.4 represents the average cumulative abnormal returns ( CNT ) for different
event windows for buying firms, selling firms, and REITs. Timberland transaction
announcement impacts on the returns of firm securities were immediate. The 3-day event
window portrayed the instantaneous impact of timberland transaction announcements on
firm performance in the capital markets. In the 3-day event window, the CNT values for
buying firms and REITs were significant and these values were 2.77% and 2.52%,
respectively. In the 19-day and 25-day event windows, the CNT values for buying firms
were significant and the values were 5.42% and 6.21%, respectively.
On the other hand, the CNT values for selling firms and for selling and buying
firms as a combined group did not change significantly in any of the six event windows.
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Thus the null hypothesis that the expected value of CNT was zero for selling firms or the
combined group could not be rejected at 5% level for those firms in any of the event
windows. Thus, the capital market responded to timberland transaction announcements
with significant improvement in the buying firms’ financial performance. Capital market
performance of four publicly traded timber REITs as a group was also improved
immediately after the REIT-conversion announcements were made.

Table 3.4 Average cumulative abnormal return ( CNT ) by event windows for selling
firms, buying firms, all firms, and real estate investment trusts (REITs)
involved in timberland transactions or ownership changes in the U.S. from
1986 to 2007.
Event Windows Selling firms Buying firms
All firms
REITs
CNT (%) z-stat CNT (%)
Days
z-stat CNT (%) z-stat CNT (%) z-stat
3
0.10
0.11 2.77 2.07** 1.07 1.42
2.52 1.77*
7
-0.33 -0.24 2.83 1.38
0.82 0.71
1.01 0.47
13
-1.47 -0.78 3.54 1.27
0.35 0.22
2.29 0.78
19
0.81
0.36 5.42 1.61*
2.49 1.32
0.51 0.14
25
0.70
0.27 6.21 1.61*
2.70 1.25
1.18 0.29
31
0.77
0.26 5.43 1.26
2.46 1.02 -0.12 -0.03
** Significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.

Figure 3.2 represents the varying reactions of equity markets to the
announcements of REIT-conversion of four publicly traded timber REITs (i.e., PCL,
RYN, LFB, and PCH) from C corporations. The most dramatic change was showed by
RYN and PCL. Immediately after the REIT-conversion announcement was made public,
RYN earned an average cumulative abnormal return of 11% and the average cumulative
abnormal return line maintained a flat trend from this level until the last day of the 31-day
event window when the average cumulative abnormal return approached 9.96%. PCL,
on the other hand, showed exactly the opposite performance. After the REIT-conversion
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announcement was made, its average cumulative abnormal return gradually fell until the
11th day after the announcement (i.e., 27th day of the 31-day event window). It started
overcoming the REIT-conversion announcement shock from the 12th day after the
announcement with a rise in its average cumulative abnormal return. The reaction of the
equity markets to PCH’s and LFB’s REIT-conversion announcement was mild. Since the
financial performance of RYN and PCL was the opposite, they cancelled out each other’s
performance. Thus, the average cumulative abnormal return line for all REITs as a group
th
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Figure 3.2 Average cumulative abnormal returns ( H NG ) over the 31-day event window
obtained in ordinary least squares (OLS) for four real estate investment trusts
(REITs). Zero (0) on the horizontal axis indicates the date of REITconversion announcement.
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3.4.2 Cross-sectional analysis
There were 24 selling firms and 21 buying firms in 33 timberland transactions.
While some buying firms took part in more than one buying events, and some selling
firms in more than one selling events, some firms took part both in selling and buying
events. This explains why the number of buyers or sellers involved in 33 timberland
transactions was less than the number of transactions. Several buying and selling firms
were dropped of cross-sectional analysis since their firm level financial data were not
available in the COMPUSTAT database.
The mean of the variable ALL was 0.4231 meaning 42.31% of the firms sold all
their timberland. Similarly, the variables PARTY , TRAN , SIZE, TIME, and ROA had means
0.308, 0.8077, 0.254, 12.42 (years) and 11.96 respectively. Table 3.5 represents the
results of the cross-sectional study. The null hypothesis that the average cumulative
abnormal returns were independent of ALL, TIME, ROA, PARTY and TRAN could not be
rejected. Thus, these variables did not significantly impact the size of the average
cumulative abnormal return. Only

SIZE

variable was significant in all event windows

except in the 31-day event window. In fact,

SIZE

was defined as the ration of timberland

transaction size to firm total asset. So, the timberland transaction cost relative to firm
total asset is crucial in explaining the average cumulative abnormal returns.
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Table 3.5 Cross-sectional regression of average cumulative abnormal returns ( CNT ) on
different financial characteristics of all forestry firms in the United States by
different event windows.
Variable

3-day

Ei
Intercept
ALL
TIME
ROA
SIZE
PARTY
TRAN

CNT

7-day

Ei

t -stat

-9.05
-0.48
0.66
-0.02
8.50
0.63
-0.80

-0.65
-0.17
1.55
-0.13
2.67**
0.18
-0.07

t -stat

-5.83 -1.09
0.69 0.65
0.23 1.39
0.03 0.48
5.69 4.64***
-0.06 -0.05
1.22 0.26

CNT

13-day

Ei
-13.13
-2.00
0.72
0.05
11.65
0.24
2.01

CNT

t -stat
-0.85
-0.65
1.53
0.35
3.29***
0.06
0.15

19-day

Ei
-9.39
0.50
0.66
0.08
13.40
-1.38
-1.09

CNT

25-day

CNT

CNT

31-day

t -stat

Ei

t -stat

Ei

t -stat

-0.35
0.09
0.80
0.30
2.16**
-0.21
-0.05

-10.34
0.54
0.62
0.08
13.87
-1.65
-0.04

-0.33
0.09
0.66
0.25
1.95*
-0.22
0.00

-27.25
1.53
0.89
0.20
10.09
-0.26
13.59

-0.88
0.25
0.94
0.64
1.42
-0.03
0.51

***significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level

3.4.3 Risk analysis
For risk analysis, 25 firms were selected. The screening process was based on the
availability of stock return information. Some firms were merged with others and they
were no longer listed in the stock market. Therefore, the daily data of their stock returns
were not available. The results of risk analysis and their statistical significance are
reported in Table 3.6.
Standardized measures of systematic risk ( E i ) were all significant except for
Plum Creek Timber Company, Inc. (10-06-1998), McDonald Investment Company (1102-1998) and U.S. Timberlands Company (06-09-1999). Since a market portfolio
contains all the risky assets, all the unique or unsystematic risks attributable to individual
assets in the portfolio are diversified away. However, systematic risks remain in the
portfolio and change over time with the variation of macroeconomic variables that affect
individual firms and industries (Reilly and Brown 1997). Thus, the significant E i values
derived by this study were quite reasonable.
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Table 3.6 Comparison of risks of the buying, and selling firms before and after
timberland transaction events from 2006 to 1987 in the United States.
Date

Firms

Risk parameters at different window lengths (days)

Ei
09-04-1986
09-26-1995
11-28-1995
11-28-1995
02-28-1996
02-28-1996
03-06-1996
03-12-1996
03-12-1996
07-23-1996
07-23-1996
08-07-1996
12-17-1996
12-26-1996
02-18-1997
02-18-1997
08-04-1997
09-15-1997
03-10-1998
03-10-1998
10-06-1998
11-02-1998
11-16-1998
01-06-1999
06-09-1999
06-10-1999
06-10-1999
07-30-1999
10-13-1999
11-01-1999
10-23-2001
12-15-2003
04-04-2006

Louisiana-Pacific Corporation
Fiberboard Corporation
Roseburg Forest Products Company
Weyerhaeuser NR Company
Weyerhaeuser NR Company
Hanson, PLC
IP Timberlands, Ltd
Willamette Industries
Hanson, PLC
U.S. Timberlands Company, LP
Weyerhaeuser NR Company
River wood International Corporation
Kimberly-Clark Corporation
Georgia-Pacific Corporation
Hancock Timber Resource Group
James River Corporation
International Paper Company
Trillium Corporation
IP Forest Resources Company
IP Timberlands Ltd
Plum Creek Timber Company, Inc.
McDonald Investment Company
Campbell Group, Inc.
Kimberly-Clark Corporation
U.S. Timberlands Company, LP
Joshua Management, LLC
Kimberly-Clark Corporation
Smurfit-Stone Container Corporation
Alliance Forest Products, Inc.
Georgia-Pacific Corporation
Bowater, Inc.
Weyerhaeuser NR Company
International Paper Company

50
1.07***
1.19***
1.10***
0.22
0.23
0.49**
0.73***
0.05
0.43**
0.71**
0.41*
0.86***
-0.05
1.31***
0.91***
0.39***
0.85***
0.43***
0.90***
0.90***
-0.02
0.07
0.58
0.23*
-0.06
1.42***
0.00
0.50**
0.57**
0.56**
2.27***
0.80***
1.60***

100
1.16***
1.03***
1.25***
0.22
0.29**
0.63
0.92***
0.12**
0.46
0.11
0.20**
0.48**
0.19**
1.09***
1.08***
0.38***
0.70***
0.22
0.71***
0.77***
0.07
0.14
0.64***
0.08**
0.02
1.37***
0.14**
0.35***
0.49***
0.77***
2.11***
0.47
1.34***

Ji
150
200
1.16*** 1.13***
0.98*** 0.97***
1.07*** 1.18***
0.12
0.28***
**
0.27
0.28**
0.36
0.55**
***
0.90
0.86***
**
0.23
0.21**
0.44
0.50**
0.08
0.09
0.25** 0.32***
0.30** 0.32***
0.23** 0.23***
1.02*** 1.02***
1.00*** 0.81***
0.39*** 0.36***
0.74*** 0.72***
0.04
-0.06
0.70*** 0.62***
0.80*** 0.72***
0.09
0.04
0.17
0.17
0.78*** 0.81***
0.17** 0.23***
0.07
0.05
1.35*** 1.29***
0.16** 0.13**
0.47*** 0.46***
0.43*** 0.47***
0.93*** 1.05***
2.29*** 2.06***
0.17
-0.06
1.50*** 1.37***

50
0.01
-0.06
-0.01
-0.03
0.00
0.01
-0.06
0.05
-0.04
0.03
0.10
0.11
-0.03
0.09
0.11
-0.01
-0.06
-0.07
0.01
0.03
-0.10*
0.05
-0.32
0.07
0.05
-0.05
0.02
0.08
-0.01
-0.14
1.04**
-0.33
-0.03

100
0.02
-0.02
0.01
-0.05
-0.01
0.08
-0.03
0.05
0.07
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.10*
0.00
0.00
-0.07
0.00
0.00
-0.16***
-0.01
-0.11
0.04
0.01
-0.04
0.02
0.22***
0.08
-0.05
0.92***
-0.20
-0.05

150
0.07**
-0.02
0.02
-0.08**
-0.02
0.08
-0.03
-0.01
0.05
0.00
0.01
0.04
0.00
0.02
0.03
-0.01
0.00
0.05
0.00
0.00
-0.19***
-0.04
-0.13
-0.03
0.02
-0.04
0.08**
0.15**
0.18***
-0.02
1.05***
0.13
-0.08

200
0.07**
-0.01
0.04
-0.06**
-0.05
0.07
-0.03
-0.03
0.06
-0.02
0.02
0.00
-0.01
0.01
0.02
-0.01
0.01
0.06
0.02
0.02
-0.17***
0.00
-0.01
-0.04
0.06*
-0.05
0.11***
0.17***
0.10
-0.04
0.96***
0.25*
-0.06

***significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level; Pair of
firms on the same date are buying and selling firms in the same event; Buying firms are
in italic.

For 50 days before and after the announcement of a timberland transaction (either
buying or selling) event, the standardized measure of systematic risk significantly
changed for two firms; it increased for one selling firm, and decreased for one buying
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firm. For 100 days before and after the transaction announcements, systematic risk
significantly changed for four firms; it increased for two selling firms and one buying
firm and decreased for one buying firm. For 150 before and after the event, systematic
risk significantly changed for seven firms; it increased for four selling firms and one
buying firm and decreased for one selling firms and one buying firm. For 200 days
before and after the event, systematic risk changed for eight firms; it increased for four
selling firms and two buying firms and decreased for one selling firm and one buying
firm. Overall, systematic risk changed for six selling firms and four buying firms. In all
windows, systematic risk increased for one selling firms (Bowater International) and
decreased for one buying firm (Plum Creek Timber Company, Inc.). Thus, it could not
be concluded whether selling firms or buying firms were exposed to more (or less) risky
situation due to timberland transactions. The only factor the risk was associated with was
the time length of window. The longer the event windows were, the higher the number of
firms experienced changes in their systematic risk.

3.5 Discussion and conclusions
In timberland transaction events, buying firms’ financial performance in the
capital markets improved significantly. Capital market response to timberland
transaction announcements was not significant for selling firms, and all firms as a group.
For the REIT-group, capital market response was immediate but not persistent. Overall,
the financial performance of buying firms was superior to that of the REITs. Selling firm
financial performance remained unchanged. As a result of timberland transaction
announcements, financial performance of the REIT group was improved when compared
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to that of the combined group of sellers and buyers. Besides, investors preferred holding
industrial timberlands within REITs rather than traditional C corporation structures
(Mendell et al. 2008). Thus, a conversion to REIT structure has two-way benefits:
improved performance in capital markets and ensured internal timber supply for mills.
Alongside timberland transaction announcements, several other factors impacted
the size of cumulative abnormal returns of firms. A transaction might appear to be larger
or smaller compared to the total assets of a certain firm. Thus, a relative transaction size,
defined as the ration of the transaction cost to the total asset of the firm, had real impact
on the financial performance of the firm. On the contrary, factors like when the
transaction took place, how big was the return on firm total asset did not significantly
contribute to a firm’s average cumulative abnormal return.
Although timberland transaction announcements impacted several firms’
systematic risk, there was no clearly identifiable trend for an increase or decrease of risk
for selling or buying firms. That is, the risk was not associated to whether the firm was a
seller or buyer. Rather, risk was contributed by the post event window length. Risk
increased for more firms in longer post event windows.
This study has investigated the response of financial markets to the
announcements of selling or buying industrial timberlands or conversion of firm
corporate structures to REITs. Thus, the findings of this study combined with other
relevant financial factors may be used to conclude whether these announcements were
financially robust decisions. So, the industrial corporate timberland owners may be
benefitted in the post-evaluation process of their timberland divestiture decisions. Again,
since the study has evaluated how each firm, involved in timberland transactions or REIT
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conversions, behaved in the capital markets, potential investors may find a direction as to
where they should invest their money to obtain better financial returns. This study
suggests that, the investors would prefer investing in the stocks of a timberland buyer to
that of a REIT. Although Weyerhaeuser NR Company has not been included in this
study, returns to its securities after its conversion to a REIT structure (on January 1,
2010) exhibited an increasing trend. Its financial performance and its investment
potential were moving forward after the conversion announcement (Mendell and Mishra
2010). This further strengthens the study findings that REIT-conversion is financially a
better option for timberland owners. Since selling firm financial performance did not
change or improve significantly, investors may not find it profitable to invest in their
stocks.
Though this study is based on financial data of publicly traded timber REITs, it
may be applied to many private timberland owners interested to convert to REITs. Since
this study suggests that, capital markets responded positively to REIT-conversions,
private timberland owners might use this finding to take financially wise steps to convert
to private REITs. Already there are successful private timber-REITs in the markets,
Anderson Tully Timber Company, for example. Since private REITs are performing well
and this study reports that REIT structures promise better returns in the capital markets,
private timberland owners’ motivations to convert their timberlands to REITs might be
stronger in future.
Risk is related more to time rather than whether a party is a timberland buyer or
seller. Thus, the sellers or buyers may use the study findings to have a future look about
the systematic risk they will potentially face while dealing with timberland transactions.
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Cross-sectional regression has showed that only SIZE variable was significant in
deciding the magnitude of average cumulative abnormal returns. The relative variable
SIZE , defined as the ratio of timberland selling or buying cost to firm total asset, was

significant in the study. Rather than transaction size or firm total asset alone, amount of
money as a percentage of firm total assets to be invested in purchasing timberland was
even more important. Thus, significance of the SIZE variable indicates that, the study
can be replicated for firms of any size. The implication of this finding is that, firms with
larger total asset have significantly larger capacity to invest in timberlands compared to
those firms having comparatively smaller total asset.
There are many factors believed to have leverage on a firm’s financial status in
the equity markets. Many factors were beyond the scope of this study. Thus, more
detailed studies could be carried out to investigate the cross-sectional factors that can
influence equity returns. This traditional event analysis is based on ordinary least square
regression which is based on homoscedasticity assumption. Checking for
heteroskedasticity, GARCH models can be employed to more precisely predict the
financial performance of forest products firms involved in timberland transactions or
REIT conversion. Overall, this study improves our understanding on how, and to what
extent, a forest products firm’s capital market performance could be affected by a firm’s
announcements of timberland transactions or conversations to a REIT.
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CHAPTER IV
WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF TIMBERLAND OWNERSHIP CHANGES
ON U.S. TIMBER MARKETS

4.1 Introduction
Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, there has been an unprecedented change in
industrial timberland ownership in the United States. Primary sellers were vertically
integrated forest products firms (hereafter, industrial corporate timberland owners) and
the largest identifiable group of buyers was nonindustrial corporate timberland investors.
Investment in timberland by nonindustrial corporate owners in the U.S. has grown from
under $1 billion in 1985 (Li and Zhang 2007) to $15 billion in 2005 (Clutter et al. 2005).
Primary factors for selling timberlands include poor shareholder returns, debt reduction
through the sale of timberland assets, increased tax efficiency through the movement to
more efficient tax structures such as REITs or subchapter S corporations, development of
tax strategies to minimize the impact of large capital gains taxes, decreased significance
of internal timber supplies attributed to mature timber markets, realization of the
appreciation value of timberland assets, and rethinking of the long-held belief that
timberland ownership was essential for timber supply to forest product mills at a
reasonable cost (Hickman 2007; Rogers and Munn 2003; Yin et al. 1998).
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Primary reasons for buying timberland by TIMOs were favorable returns and low
risk, its apparent correlation with inflation thus providing a “hedge” against inflation
(Clutter et al. 2005). Hickman (2007) added that passage of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 and the Real Estate Investment Trust
Simplification Act (REITSA) of 1997 also created a favorable environment for
nonindustrial owners to invest in timberlands. The former encouraged nonindustrial
corporate owners to seek increased returns by diversifying their investment portfolios to
include more than just fixed-income securities like government and corporate bonds and
the latter precluded industrial corporate timberland owners from forming timber REITs
(Hickman 2007).
There is one major difference between industrial corporate timberland owners and
nonindustrial corporate timberland owners (i.e., TIMOs and REITs) with regard to tax
treatment of timberlands and timber. Industrial corporate timberland owners are usually
classified as Sub-Chapter C corporations, and TIMOs/REITs are classified as SubChapter S corporations. However, any profits obtained from timber sales by industrial
timberland owners are taxed twice – once at the corporate level (usually 35%), and once
at the stockholder level when dividends are disbursed (usually 15%). The practical effect
of this tax policy is that shareholders of industrial corporate owners can recoup as little as
50% out of every dollar of profit made from a timber sale. In contrast, shareholders of
REITs and TIMOs can normally retain about 85% of the profit from timber sales with a
15% tax rate (Clutter et al. 2005; Hagan et al. 2005; Siegel 2004). As a result, income
taxation law has become one of the major driving forces behind timberland sales since
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Presumably, this shift in timberland ownership has
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considerable consequences on stakeholder economic surplus in U.S. timber markets.
Previously, one perceived benefits of owning timberland for forest products firms was
guaranteed timber supplies for their mills. Nonetheless, from the perspective of NIPF
landowners, there has been wide concern that internal timber supplies by forest products
firms may have negative impacts on timber markets and NIPF landowner welfare
(Murray 1995).
Past studies (Daughtrey et al. 1987; Sun 2007) analyzed various issues related to
taxation laws. For example, Boyd and Daniels (1985) applied a General Equilibrium
Model (GEM) to examine income taxation in forestry. Welfare losses generated by
preferential capital gains treatment of timber were much greater than previously
imagined. Federal taxation laws available to industrial corporate timberland owners were
one of the major forces pushing them to divest their timberlands. About 37 million ac of
industrial timberland was sold between 1981 and 2005. Of this, 15 million ac were sold
to TIMOs, 10 million ac to conservation groups, 10 million ac to publicly traded REITs
and master limited partnerships (MLPs), and 2 million ac to private forest product
companies (Boyd 2006; Hickman 2007). Since the share of timberland acquired by
conservation groups was large, and the primary objective of their owning timberland is
not timber management, it will potentially impact timber markets with supply reductions.
Since industrial corporate timberland owners own both forest land and related
manufacturing facilities, they have specific strategic timber supply objectives that
influence their decisions about when to cut timber and how long to hold on to timberland.
Although TIMOs and REITs have affiliated mills (treated as independent entities), they
don’t own any mills like that of vertically integrated forest products firms (Block and
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Sample 2001a; Hickman 2007). Thus, they don’t need to maintain a harvesting schedule
similar to that of corporate industrial owners.
Different owners have different objectives for owning timberland. Traditionally,
industrial corporate owners owned timberland to meet internal demands for timber for
their mills. They purchased millions of ac of timberland in 1940s to support their mills
(Boyd 2006). Along with internal timber supply objectives, they sought to comply with
recognized forest certification programs like Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) and
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) or environmental regulations like forestry best
management practices (BMPs). Several studies (Binkley et al. 1996; Block and Sample
2001b; Clutter et al. 2005) assumed that initially, it was unclear whether all the TIMOs
and REITs would be willing to accept programs that had potential to increase their timber
production costs. Less than half of the TIMOs and REITs in the United States were
participating in third-party certification programs by 2007 (Bowyer and Howe 2007).
However, their activities as presented in their respective websites in 2010 showed that
most TIMOs and REITs adopted third-party certification programs.
All timberland owners, including industrial owners and TIMOs, sold timberlands
in smaller tracts that were close to urban or developing areas. Most land being used for
rapidly increasing urban sprawl came from forest land (LaGro and DeGloria 1992). One
of the major non-forestry conversions of timberland is real estate development. Land
parcels close to urban areas were sold to developers for urban development. This
conversion was being deliberately done by landowners in order to capture higher prices
for those parcels compared to regular timberland prices and to increase land value
through such conversion (Zinkhan 1993). Bowyer and Howe (2007) reported concerns
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about forest land conversion or its parcelization or fragmentation through land sales and
real estate development activities. Thus, through parcelization a certain portion of
timberland, although small compared to the entire landbase, was leaving timber
production.
Industrial supplies of timber reduced significantly since their timberlands were
being sold to TIMOs and other private organizations. However, this might not adversely
affect timber markets since TIMOs manage their lands with an intensity that is similar to
the management intensity maintained by corporate industrial landowners (Bowyer and
Howe 2007; Rogers and Munn 2003). The objectives of owning timberland by
conservation agencies were different from those of industrial or nonindustrial corporate
landowners. While the major objective of owning timberland by industrial or
nonindustrial corporate landowners was to maximize timber production, the major
objective of conservation agencies was to maximize environmental benefits. This causes
a net reduction of timber supplies.
Thus, timber markets could suffer a two-way supply shortage of timber: (1)
reductions of the timberland base through conversion of timberland to HBUs and (2) a
reduced supply from the land acquired by conservation agencies. This reduction in
timber supply presumably could have consequences on consumer and producer surpluses
in the timber markets. This study was designed to address the extent of timber market
equilibrium displacement (i.e., displacement of timber price and quantity supplied) and to
evaluate its subsequent impact on producer surplus and consumer surplus in the U.S.
timber markets.
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4.2 Methods
To address the identified research issues, an equilibrium displacement model
(EDM) was used. EDMs have been widely used to estimate the displacement of market
equilibrium caused by external shocks such as adoption of a new policy or imposition of
environmental regulations on forest resource use. Displacements of price and quantity
can be measured by EDMs. These displacements can be used to estimate the economic
surplus changes for consumers and producers in the market. Thus, EDMs are a powerful
methodology for welfare analysis. Several studies (Boyd and Daniels 1985; Brown and
Zhang 2005; Sun 2006; Sun and Kinnucan 2001) used EDMs to determine impacts of law
and policy shocks on timber markets.

4.2.1 Conceptual model
Following Brown and Zhang (2005), Sun and Kinnucn (2001), and Sun (2006),
the total timber market has been modeled with the following system of equations:
Timber supply by industrial corporate owners

Qi

f ( P, Li )

[4.1]

Timber supply by NIPF landowners

Qn

g ( P, Ln )

[4.2]

Timber supply by nonindustrial corporate and other owners Qr

h( P, Lr )

[4.3]

Qi  Qn  Qr  Qg

[4.4]

Aggregate timber supply

Qs

Aggregate timber demand

Qd

k ( P)

[4.5]

Market clearance

Qd

Qs

[4.6]

where, P is the timber price; Li , Lr , Ln are respectively the acreage of timberland
owned by industrial corporate timberland owners, nonindustrial corporate landowners
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and NIPF and other private owners; and Qg is the supply of timber by public ownership.
The model has four exogenous variables Li , Ln , Lr , and Qg and six endogenous variables
Qi , Qn , Qr , Qs , Qd , and

P

.

The model is constructed based on the following assumptions:
(a) Timber supply by public ownership is not affected by market forces. Rather, how
much to supply is an administrative decision and it is assumed constant over the
study period.
(b) The supply shift is parallel and is caused by two factors. One, all owners sell
some parcels of timberland within close proximity to developed or urban areas.
These parcels are assumed to be a small percentage compared to the total
timberland base. The other is the change in the intensity of timberland
management. When a corporate industrial owner changed the timberland
ownership structure to REITs, or sold timberland to TIMOs, it was assumed that
the management intensity did not change for these converted or transacted lands.
The objective of owning timberland by conservation organizations was somewhat
different from that of industrial owners. Since they focused more on
conservation, their timber management intensity for timber production would
diminish dramatically. This caused a reduction in timber production and thereby
supply.
(c) There is no demand shock over the study period.
(d) The timber market is competitive and a common timber price prevails in regional
markets.
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(e) Timber demand is a factor of timber prices and timber supply depends on timber
prices and local timber production only.
(f) There was no literature on timberland elasticity. It was assumed that there was a
direct linear relationship between the size of the landbase, and inventory and
timber supply; although this may only be true in the short run. According to this
assumption, following relationship between existing timberland base ( L ) and
corresponding timber inventory ( I ) for owner m (where m is i, n, r , and g ) was
deduced
Lm

[4.7]

tI m

where t is a proportional constant. By total differentiation, equation [4.7] yields [4.8],

dLm tdI m

[4.8]

The above equation system ([4.1] through [4.6]) can be totally differentiated as
follows.

Qi

H i P  [i Li

[4.9]

Qn

H n P  [n Ln

[4.10]

Qr

H r P  [r Lr

[4.11]

Qs

OiQi  OnQn  Or Qr  Og Qg

[4.12]

Qd

KP

[4.13]

Qd

Qs

[4.14]

A complete derivation of equations [4.9] through [4.14] is given in Appendix A.
The variables with tildes indicate percentage changes in those variables. For example,
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Li equals the remaining industrial timberland acreage after divestiture minus the original
timberland acreage before divestiture divided by the timberland before divestiture. More
directly, Li indicates the negative of acreage of industrial timberland divested divided by
the original acreage of industrial timberland. The symbols H ’s, [ ’s, and K are supply,
inventory and demand elasticities, respectively, and Om ’s are timber supply shares for
each owner compared to the total market supply.
There is an implicit relationship among owner landbases; total timberland is the
sum of all timberland and the parcels that were converted by all owners to higher and
better (non-forestry) uses ( LHBU ). These parcels went out of timber production. Thus,
the relationship can be expressed as,
L

Li  Ln  Lr  Lg  LHBU

[4.15]

Equation [4.15] on total differentiation, gives [4.16].
L

Lili  Lnln  Lr lr  Lg lg  LHBU
lHBU
H
H

[4.16]

where, lm ’s are the land shares of each owners with reference to the total timberland of all
owners. Compared to the total timberland in the U.S., the higher and better use land (
LHBU ) that went out of timber production base was small and it was assumed that lHBU

was equal to zero. This also implies that even though substantial acreage changed
ownership, the total timberland area remained almost constant over time which implied
that, L was equal to zero. According to Smith et al. (2010), the balance between public
and private timberland has not changed since 1953. This suggests that private timberland
ownership change remained confined within the purview of private owners and the public
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timberland base remained constant over this period, i.e. Lg . was equal to zero. Thus
equation [4.16] reduces to [4.17],

Lr



Li li  Lnln
lr

[4.17]

Again, since timber supply from public forest land is not affected either by market forces
or by the timber tax policy, Qg . was equal to zero. Given these and substituting
equations [4.9], [4.10] and [4.11] into [4.12],
Qs

§ Li li  Lnln ·
¸
lr
©
¹

OiH i P  Oi[i Li  OnH n P  On[ n Ln  Or H r P  Or[ r ¨ 

[4.18]

Substituting equations [4.18] and [4.13] into [4.14], and solving for P yields
equation [4.19].

§ Li li  Lnln ·
¸
lr
©
¹
K  OiH i  OnH n  Or H r

Oi[i Li  On[ n Ln  Or[ r ¨
P

[4.19]

Substituting [4.19] into [4.13] and solving for Q ,

Q Ku

§ Li li  Lnln ·
¸
lr
©
¹
K  OiH i  OnH n  Or H r

Oi[i Li  On[ n Ln  Or[ r ¨

Equations [4.19] and [4.20] are the reduced forms for percentage changes in
timber price and equilibrium quantity in the market expressed in terms of elasticity
parameters and timberland ownership changes (i.e., exogenous supply shocks).
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[4.20]

Vertical shift in supply is equivalent to a percentage change in price holding the
quantity supplied constant (i.e. Vs is defined as, P |Qs 0 ). As measured by Sun and
Kinnucn (2001), vertical shift in supply was calculated with equation [4.21].

Vs

§ Ll  L l ·
Oi[i Li  On[ n Ln  Or[ r ¨ i i n n ¸
lr
©
¹

OiH i  OnH n  Or H r

[4.21]

Again, following Sun and Kinnucn (2001) and Brown and Zhang (2005), and
using Figure 4.1, economic surplus changes due to supply shifts were calculated using
equations [4.22] through [4.26]. Please see Appendix A for a complete derivation of
these equations.

'PSi

1
P 0Qi0 (1  Qi )( P  Vs )
2

[4.22]

'PSr

1
P 0Qr0 (1  Qr )( P  Vs )
2

[4.23]

'PSn

1
P 0Qn0 (1  Qn )( P  Vs )
2

[4.24]

'PSG ( Pa  P0 )QG0
'CS

[4.25]

1
 P 0Q0 P(1  Q)
2

[4.26]

Parameters with superscript ‘0’ and ‘a’ indicate values before and after
landownership change, respectively. U.S. average timber prices and timber supplies in
2006 were used in this study. Displacements of timber prices in softwood and hardwood
markets were calculated using equation [4.19]. Similarly, the overall displacement of
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equilibrium quantity of hardwood and softwood supply was calculated using equation
[4.20].
This study could be planned to evaluate the impact of a specific year’s
landownership change on timber economy. Since timberland ownership change from
year to year during the study period varied widely, estimating surplus changes based on
annual average timberland ownership change over the study period was more relevant.
Thus, producer surplus, consumer surplus and total surplus were calculated based on
annual average timberland ownership change from 1987 through 2006. Again, EDMs are
partial equilibrium models and, these are used in analyzing short term impacts of
exogenous economic shocks. Thus, it may be shaky to measure the impacts of total
timberland ownership change throughout the study period using EDMs. Yet, it might be
interesting to examine the welfare implications of total timberland ownership change
during the study period. With this view in mind, surplus changes were also calculated
based also on total timberland ownership change from 1987 through 2006.
Annual average and total values for Li and Ln were used in equations [4.19],
[4.20], and [4.21] to calculate two sets of values for P, Q, and Vs . Using each set of
values thus obtained and the U.S. softwood price and supply data in equations [4.22],
[4.23], [4.24], [4.25], and [4.26], producer and consumer surplus changes were
calculated, respectively, for industrial corporate timberland owners, nonindustrial
corporate owners, NIPF landowners, government, and consumers in the U.S. softwood
markets for annual average and total landbase change rates during the study period. In
the same way, hardwood prices and supply data were used to calculate producer and
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consumer surplus changes in the hardwood markets based on annual average and total
landbase change rates during the study period.
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Figure 4.1 The displacement of timber market equilibria, vertical shifts in timber prices
and surplus changes for producers, consumers and society in the U.S. timber
markets from 1987 through 2006; S m , Qm and D are respectively supply
curve, timber supply for owners m ( i, r, n, G) and timber demand;
i industrial corporate , r nonindustrial corporate ,
n nonindustrial private and G =Public; Parameters with superscript ‘0’ and
‘a’ indicate values before and after landownership change, respectively;
Figure is not drawn to scale.

4.2.2 Sensitivity analysis
The EDM study is dependent on the already evaluated elasticity estimates derived
from existing literature. Studies presented in Table 4.3 are localized to different U.S.
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regions and timber types. Not all elasticity estimates needed to complete this study were
available and these were assumed based on comparison of the management regimes the
landowners adopted. Again, some estimates were dated and might not give the
appropriate estimates for the year 2006. Furthermore, there was no literature on
timberland elasticities; hence inventory elasticities were used assuming a direct linear
relationship among timberland base, inventory, and timber supply. Finally, historical
U.S. timber price data showed that, prices varied from state to state and region to region.
For these reasons, a sensitivity analysis for elasticities and timber prices was necessary to
examine the extent of surplus changes for landowners, consumers, and society.
There are several ways to perform sensitivity analysis on stochastic parameters.
Sun and Kinnucan (2001) evaluated the welfare loss borne by southern landowners due
their conformity to environmental programs. They carried out a stochastic simulation to
place 95% confidence intervals around mean welfare estimates for landowners. Brown
and Zhang (2005) evaluated the industrial landowner surplus loss attributed to their
conformity to SFI. Unlike Sun and Kinnucan (2001), Brown and Zhang (2005) increased
and decreased elasticity estimates by 50% and examined the changes in surplus for
different landowners.
In this study, a stochastic simulation was carried out on elasticity estimates and
timber prices. Each elasticity parameters was lowered by 25% of its estimated value to
obtain its lower bound for a simulation process. Similarly, it was raised by 25% to get the
upper bound. These upper and lower bounds of the parameter formed the stochastic
range for the parameter to vary in the simulation process. For timber prices, the
stochastic range was defined by minimum and maximum average timber prices across the
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U.S. Each parameter estimate of elasticity and price was simulated with 10,000
iterations. Since timberland divestiture and timber supply data were collected directly
from 2006 real world markets, these were held constant while the sensitivity analysis was
carried out. All calculations and simulation process were done using statistical software
package R 2.12.1 and the R-codes are presented in Appendix C.

4.3 Data and data sources

4.3.1 Timberland ownership
Table 4.1 illustrates the patterns of forest land ownership in the U.S. in 2006.
Smith et al. (2010) split U.S. timberland ownership into four zones: North (Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin), South (Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas), Rocky Mountain (Kansas,
Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming) and Pacific Coast (Alaska, Oregon, Washington,
California, Hawaii). Timberland ownership is classified in two broad categories: public
and private. Private timberland owners are categorized into three subclasses: industrial
corporate timberland owners, nonindustrial corporate timberland owners (TIMOs and
REITs) and NIPF landowners.
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Table 4.1 Forest land area in thousands of acres in the United States by ownerships,
regions and sub-regions, 2006.
Region

Public

Private

All

IC

NIC

NIPF

North

43,978

6,804

27,215

94,041

172,039

NE

16,621

4,870

19,479

43,825

84,796

NC

27,357

1,934

7,736

50,215

87,243

South

28,679

12,089

48,354

125,522

214,644

SE

14,336

5,162

20,647

47,744

87,889

SC

14,344

6,927

27,706

77,779

126,756

112,755

2,754

11,018

24,135

150,661

GP

1,669

70

282

3,736

5,757

IM

111,086

2,684

10,736

20,399

144,905

142,786

10,227

40,910

19,960

213,883

AK

90,994

6,364

25,454

4,058

126,869

PNW

31,584

2,778

11,112

6,974

52,449

PSW

20,208

1,086

4,343

8,928

34,565

U.S.

328,199

31,874

127,497

263,658

751,228

Share

43.69%

4.24%

16.97%

35.10%

100.00%

RM

PC

Source: Butler (2010); NE=Northeast; NC=North Central; SE=Southeast; SC=South
Central; RM=Rocky Mountain; GP=Great Plains; IM=Intermountain; PC=Pacific Coast;
AK=Alaska; PNW=Pacific Northwest; PSW=Pacific Southwest; IC=Industrial corporate
owners; NIC=Nonindustrial corporate owners; NIFP=Nonindustrial private forest
landowners; data may not add to totals due to rounding.

4.3.2 Timberland ownership changes over time
Approximately two thirds of the total forest land in the U.S. is timberland. Forest
land that produces or is capable of producing crops of industrial wood and has not been
withdrawn from timber production by statute or administrative regulation is termed
timberland (Fiacco 2011). By 2006, U.S. timberland totaled 517 million ac. Since the
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late 1980s and early 1990s, there have been large-scale timberland transactions. Rinehart
(2001) reported that about 20 million ac of timberland were divested in a 12-year period
from 1989 to 2001. Of this, industrial corporate timberland owners divested 15.9 million
ac accounting for 79.5% of the total ac sold during this period. Boyd (2006) reported that
industrial corporate timberland owners held 68 million ac of timberland in the U.S. in
1981. By 2005, their holdings dropped just to 21 million ac, a 69.1% reduction. In
contrast, over the same period, the holdings of TIMOs and REITs grew from just zero to
over 25 million ac. By 2006, industrial corporate timberland owners had divested nearly
80% of their timberland holdings. Most of this is now owned by nonindustrial corporate
owners (i.e., TIMOs and REITs).
As reported in Table 4.2, from 1987 through 2006, timberland ownership for
industrial corporate landowners decreased by 68.73%, an annual average decrease of
3.44%. Similarly, the decrease of NIPF timberland ownership was 10.07% in total and
0.50% annually during the same period. Using this information and Lr

( Li li  Lnln ) / lr ,

total and annual values of Lr were estimated to be 0.4802 and 0.0239, respectively.
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Table 4.2 Chronological patterns of timberland ownership in millions of acres by
industrial corporate landowners (IC), nonindustrial private forest landowners
(NIPF) and the public ownership in the United States from 1952 to 2006 and
total and annual percentage change rate of timberland ownership from 1987 to
2006.
Owners

Date

Total Change

Annual change

1952a

1962a

1977a

1987a

1992a

2006b

1987-2006

1987-2006

58.98

61.43

68.94

70.35

70.46

22.00

-68.73%

-3.44%

NIPF

304.44

307.53

285.25

283.56

287.61

255.00

-10.07%

-0.50%

Public

145.45

146.16

138.17

151.03

131.49

156.00

3.29%

0.16%

Total

508.87

515.12

492.36

504.94

489.56

433.00

-10.71%

-0.54%

IC

Sources: a Powell et al. (1993); b Smith et al. (2010).

4.3.3 Timber prices
Forest products input markets have been shaped by the distinct characteristics of
the forest products industry. The paper industry, for example, has high fixed costs for its
plants. High transportation costs of bulky wood significantly increases production cost
(Asinas 2001; Mei and Sun 2008b). The high capital requirement is a major barrier for
small firms entering paper manufacturing. Thus, the evolution of the paper industry has
made it structurally concentrated among a few larger processing firms (Mei and Sun
2008b) with oligopsonic to strong monopsonic power in purchasing domestic pulpwood
(Asinas 2001). These factors suggest segregated regional timber markets.
Quarterly softwood and hardwood prices for 2006 were collected from multiple
online sources. These sources were accessed through Logprice.com (2010) and USDAFS
(2010). Price data were collected for 50% of the states (i.e., 25 states) randomly chosen
from six different zones of the United States: Northeast (NE), North Central (NC),
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Southeast (SE), South Central (SC), Rocky Mountains (RM) and Pacific Coast (PC).
Softwood prices for all four quarters of 2006 for a specific state were averaged to obtain
the state simple average softwood price for that state. Obtained in this way, the 25 state
average prices were further averaged to obtain the U.S. simple average softwood price.
The same process was followed to obtain the U.S. simple average hardwood price.

4.3.4 Demand elasticities
Region-wise elasticity data were needed in addition to timber price data. Table
4.3 summarizes demand, supply and inventory elasticity values by U.S. geographical
regions and timber types along with their sources. Elasticity values as obtained from
existing literature varied widely from region to region within the United States. In this
study, all available elasticity values for a specific landowner type and for a certain timber
type were averaged to have a single elasticity measure for that owner and timber type. If
only one elasticity value was available from the existing literature, it was directly adopted
for this study. Table 4.4 depicts the values of all elasticities and other parameters chosen
or calculated to complete the EDM. Demand elasticities for softwood and hardwood
used in this study were -0.45 and -0.24, respectively (Buongiorno 1996).
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Table 4.3 Elasticity estimates for timber demand, supply and inventory based on
ownership and timber types and regions in the United States as available in
existing literature published from 1980 to 2008.
Data source

Owner

Timber type

Region
Demand

Adams and Haynes (1980)

Adams (1983)

Industry
Industry
Industry
Industry
Industry
Industry
Industry
Industry
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private

Buongiorno (1996)
Daniels and Hyde (1986)
Liao and Zhang (2008)

Industry
Industry
NIPF
NIPF

Nagubadi and Munn (2001)
Newman and Wear (1993)

Industry
Industry
NIPF
NIPF

Newman (1987, 1990)
Prestemon and Wear (2000)
Robinson (1974)
Robinson and Fey (1990)
Polyakov et al. (2004)

Industry
NIPF

Softwood
Softwood
Softwood
Softwood
Softwood
Softwood
Softwood
Softwood
Softwood
Softwood
Softwood
Softwood
Softwood
Softwood
Softwood
Softwood
Softwood
Softwood
Softwood
Softwood
Hardwood
Softwood and hardwood
Softwood sawtimber
Softwood pulpwood
Softwood sawtimber
Softwood pulpwood
Hardwood pulpwood
Hardwood sawtimber
Hardwood sawtimber
Hardwood pulpwood
Hardwood sawtimber
Hardwood pulpwood
Softwood sawtimber
Softwood pulpwood
Pulpwood
Pulpwood
Softwood lumber
Softwood and hardwood
Softwood pulpwood
Hardwood pulpwood

a

PNWWa
PNWEb
PSWc
RMd
SCe
SEf
NCg
NEh
PNWW
PNWE
PSW
RM
SC
SE
NC
NE
WWi
NWOj
SWOk
U.S.
U.S.
SOl
SO
SO
SO
SO
SC
SC
SE
SE
SE
SE
SO
SO

SO
SO
ALm
AL

-0.40
-0.34
-0.40
-0.39

-0.14
-0.16
-0.35
-0.45
-0.24
-0.03

-0.03
-0.05

-0.57
-0.43

-0.52
-0.25
-0.77
-1.72

Elasticities
Supply Inventory
0.26
1.00
0.16
1.46
0.26
1.00
0.39
0.47
0.99
0.32
0.06
0.18
0.12
0.06
0.39
0.30
0.31
0.99
0.34
0.18
0.15

0.41
0.49
0.20
0.37
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.66
0.72
0.35
0.28

0.27
0.70
0.90
0.29
0.32
0.04
0.08
0.27
0.58
0.22
0.33
0.55
0.23
0.66
0.12
0.32

0.16

1.87
1.65

0.39
1.20

0.35
0.35

Pacific Northwest (West); b Pacific Northwest (East); c Pacific Southwest; d Rocky
Mountain; e South Central; f Southeast; g North Central; h Northeast; i Western
Washington; j Northwest Oregon; k Southwest Oregon; l South; m Alabama.
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Table 4.4 Estimated or assumed values of elasticity parameters, landbase change rates
from 1987 to 2006, land acreage shares, and timber supply shares by timber
types and landownership types in 2006 in the United States.
Parameter Parameter descriptions

K
Hi
Hr

Demand elasticity of timber with respect to price
Price elasticity of timber supply for IC l landowners
Price elasticity of timber supply for NIC m
landowners
Price elasticity of timber supply for NIPF n
landowners
Inventory elasticity of timber for IC landowners

Timber types
Softwood
Hardwood
a
-0.45
-0.24a
0.58b
0.43c
0.55d

0.40d

0.24e

0.28f

0.70g

1.23g

Inventory elasticity of timber for NIC landowners

0.60d

1.00d

Inventory elasticity for NIPF landowners

0.75h

1.00d

Timberland share for IC landowners

0.04i

0.04i

Timberland share for NIC landowners

0.16i

0.16i

Timberland share for NIPF landowners

0.49i

0.49i

lg

Timberland share for government

0.30i

0.30i

Oi
Or
On

Timber supply share for IC landowners

0.06i

0.06i

Timber supply share for NIC landowners

0.21i

0.21i

Timber supply share for NIPF landowners

0.64i

0.65i

Og

Timber supply share for government

0.09i

0.08i

Li

Change rate of timberland base for IC landowners

Ln

Change rate of timberland base for NIPF landowners

Lr

Change rate of timberland base for NIC landowners

Hn
[i
[r
[n
li
lr
ln

a

-0.6873j
-0.0344k
-0.1007j
-0.0050k
0.4802j
0.0239k

-0.6873j
-0.0344k
-0.1007j
-0.0050k
0.4802j
0.0239k

(Buongiorno 1996); b(Adams and Haynes 1980), (Liao and Zhang 2008), (Prestemon
and Wear 2000); c(Newman and Wear 1993); d assumed; e(Adams and Haynes 1980),
(Adams 1983), (Prestemon and Wear 2000); f(Newman and Wear 1993); g(Adams and
Haynes 1980), (Nagubadi and Munn 2001); h(Adams and Haynes 1980); i calculated from
real world data; j total change rate of timberland ownership from 1987 to 2006; k annual
average change rate of timberland ownership in from 1987 to 2006; l IC = industrial
corporate ; m NIC = nonindustrial corporate; n NIPF = nonindustrial Private Forest.
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4.3.5 Supply elasticities
Liao and Zhang (2008) estimated supply elasticities for industrial softwood
sawtimber and industrial softwood pulpwood to be 0.70 and 0.90, respectively for U.S.
South. Industrial pulpwood supply elasticities estimated by Prestemon and Wear (2000)
was 0.66. Industrial softwood supply elasticity values as calculated by Adams and
Haynes (1980) and were 0.26, 0.39, 0.47, 0.99, and 0.32, respectively, for PSW, SC, SE,
NC, and NE regions. Based on these values, mean supply elasticity of industrial
softwood was calculated to be 0.58. Newman and Wear (1993) estimated supply
elasticity for hardwood sawtimber and pulpwood to be 0.27 and 0.58, respectively, for SE
and their average value, 0.43, was taken for industrial hardwood supply elasticity.
Private or NIPF softwood supply elasticity values were 0.12, 0.39, 0.30, and 0.31,
respectively, for PSW, SC, SE, and NC (Adams and Haynes 1980).
Again, private softwood supply elasticity values as calculated for the regions
WW, NWO, and SWO were 0.34, 0.18, and 0.15, respectively (Adams 1983). Prestemon
and Wear (2000) calculated NIPF pulpwood elasticity for U.S. to be 0.12. In this study,
the NIPF softwood supply elasticity was 0.24, an average of all of these elasticity values.
Newman and Wear (1993) estimated NIPF hardwood sawtimber and pulpwood as 0.22
and 0.33, respectively, and this study used the average, 0.28, for NIPF hardwood supply
elasticity (Table 4.4). Currently, there is no literature on supply elasticity of
nonindustrial corporate landowners timber supply. Since the timber management
intensity maintained by this ownership type is similar to industrial owners, their timber
supply elasticity was assumed to be closer to that of industrial owners. Thus, the
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softwood and hardwood supply elasticities from nonindustrial corporate owners were
assumed to be 0.55 and 0.40, respectively (Table 4.4).

4.3.6 Inventory elasticities
Adams and Haynes (1980) obtained 1.00, 0.46, 1.00, 0.41, 0.49, 0.20, and 0.37 as
industry softwood inventory elasticities for PNWW, PNWE, PSW, SC, SE, NC, and NE,
respectively. Nagubadi and Munn (2001) estimated inventory elasticities for hardwood
sawtimber and pulpwood to be 1.65 and 1.87 for SC region (Table 4.3). Thus, the mean
elasticity values for industry softwood and hardwood inventories were 0.70 and 1.23,
respectively (Table 4.4). Adams and Haynes (1980) also estimated NIPF softwood
inventory elasticities of 1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 0.66, 0.72, 0.35, and 0.28, respectively, for
PNWW, PNWE, PSW, RM, SC, SE, NC, and NE regions (Table 4.3). Thus, the average
NIPF softwood inventory elasticity was 0.75 (Table 4.4). Hardwood inventory elasticity
value for NIPF landowners, hardwood and softwood inventory elasticities of
nonindustrial corporate owners were not readily available in any literature. As mentioned
earlier, the timber management intensity maintained by NIC landowners was similar to
that of industrial owners and thus, their inventory elasticity was assumed to be 0.60.
Although inventory elasticity varies based on stand composition, and substitution
between pulpwood and sawtimber harvesting (Brown and Zhang 2005), the inventory
elasticities were assumed a priori as approximately unitary (Hynes and Adams 1985).
Using this piece of information, inventory elasticities for NIPF hardwood, nonindustrial
corporate softwood and hardwood were assumed to be 1.00 (Table 4.4).
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4.3.7 Timberland and timber supply shares for different landowners
Estimation of inventory elasticities to be used in the study was followed by
estimation of timberland and timber supply shares for each owner. Land shares ( l's ) for
different landowners were calculated from acreage of timberland owned by the
landowners in 2006. Similarly, supply shares ( O 's ) were calculated from timber supplied
by different timberland owners in 2006. All these share values are reported in Table 4.4.

4.4 Results

4.4.1 Displacement of timber market equilibrium
Annual average price rise was nominal. Annual average price rises for softwood
and hardwood were 0.11% and 0.14%, respectively (Table 4.5). This suggests that large
scale timberland ownership change did not greatly impact timber prices in the U.S.
timber markets. Initial and displaced quantities of softwood and hardwood timber
supplies from different landowners are also presented in Table 4.5. As expected, timber
supply decreased from industrial corporate landowners and NIPF landowners and
increased from nonindustrial corporate landowners. For softwoods and hardwoods,
industrial corporate timber supply declined by 2.34% and 4.17%, respectively, and NIPF
supply declined by 0.40% and 0.53%, respectively on annual average landownership
change basis. On the contrary, nonindustrial corporate timber supply increased annually
by 1.50% for softwood timber and 2.45% for hardwood timber based on annual average
landownership change.
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Table 4.5 Initial and displaced timber prices (due to landownership changes) and timber
supply by timber types and landownership types in the United States in 2006.
Price changes and supply changes are based on annual average timberland
transactions from 1987 through 2006.
Markets
Initial a
($/MBF)
Softwood

Hardwood

164.42

201.53

Price
Displaced
($/MBF)
164.60

201.82

Change
(%)
0.11

0.14

Landowners
Public
IC
NIC
NIPF
All c
Public
IC
NIC
NIPF
All c

Supply
Initial b
Displaced
(MMBF)
(MMBF)
10,289
10,289
6,583
6,429
25,134
25,510
76,300
76,034
118,306
118,247
5,525
3,813
14,559
44,198
68,095

Change
(%)
0.00
-2.34
1.50
-0.40
-0.05

5,525
3,654
14,916
43,995
68,071

0.00
-4.17
2.45
-0.53
-0.03

a

Average U.S. timber prices available through Logprice.com (2010) and USDAFS
(2010); b Modified from Smith et al. (2010); IC=Industrial-corporate owners;
NIC=Nonindustrial corporate owners; NIPF=Nonindustrial private forest land owners;
Price changes and supply changes are based on annual average timberland transactions
from 1987 through 2006; c Data may not add to total due to rounding.

4.4.2 Welfare analysis

4.4.2.1 Base scenario
Since timber supplies from industrial corporate landowners decreased, their
producer surplus decreased by $1.75 million and $0.89 million in softwood and
hardwood markets, respectively, when the annual average timberland sale rate (3.44% of
their total land) was considered. Thus the total annual decrease in producer surplus for
these landowners was $2.64 million. Over the entire divestiture period, industrial
corporate landowners divested 68.73% of their total timberland. Given this landbase
reduction, their producer surplus decreased by $27.18 million, $10.63 million, and $37.81

69

million, respectively, in the softwood, hardwood, and combined timber markets (Table
4.6).

Table 4.6 Changes in producer, consumer, and total surpluses in U.S. timber markets
based on total and annual average timberland ownership change rates from
1987 to 2006.
Landbase
change

Total

Annual

Surplus change (million U.S. dollars) a

Markets

Consumers

Total f

Net
-20.28

-428.61

-448.89

Softwood

Public
37.46

Producers
IC
NIC c
NIPF d
-27.18 366.37 -396.93

Hardwood

32.10

-10.63

297.46

-201.43

117.50

-394.27

-276.77

Both markets

69.56

-37.81

663.82

-598.36

97.22

-822.88

-725.67

Softwood

1.87

-1.75

15.99

-20.46

-4.35

-21.46

-25.81

Hardwood

1.61

-0.89

12.09

-10.54

2.26

-19.79

-17.53

Both markets

3.47

-2.64

28.08

-31.00

-2.09

-41.25

-43.34

b

e

a

All values are based on 2006 timber prices and supplies; b IC=Industrial corporate
landowners; c NIC=Nonindustrial corporate landowners; d NIPF=Nonindustrial private
forest landowners; e Sum of all owners’ producer surpluses; f Data may not add to total
due to rounding.

Like industrial corporate landowners, NIPF landowners’ land base reduction
contributed to their surplus loss. In 2006, they owned the biggest share (49%) of
timberland in the U.S. (Smith et al. 2010) and their timberland base was reduced from
283.56 million ac in1987 to 255 million ac in 2006 (Powell et al. 1993; Smith et al. 2010)
with an annual decline of 0.50%. Thus, among all timberland owners, NIPF landowners
faced the largest producer surplus losses. Given this average land-base reduction rate,
their surplus declined by $20.46 million and $10.54 million, respectively, in the softwood
and hardwood markets. Their total surplus loss, when softwood and hardwood markets
were combined, approximated $31 million. When the total reduction of their timberland
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base from 1987 through 2006 (10.07% of their total land) was considered, their surplus
reduction was $396.93 million in the softwood market, $201.43 million in the hardwood
market, and $598.36 million in both markets (Table 4.6).
Nonindustrial corporate owners and government, on the contrary, experienced
increased producer surplus. Producer surplus for nonindustrial corporate owners
increased for two reasons: (1) their timberland base increased considerably through land
purchases which increased their timber supply and, (2) increased timber prices due to net
decrease of timber supply by all owners. Based on their annual average timberland
purchase rate (2.39% of their total land), their producer surplus increased $15.99 million
and $12.09 million, respectively, in the softwood and hardwood markets. Their total gain
in both markets was $28.08 million. When their total land increase rate (through
purchase) from 1987 through 2006, 48.02%, was considered, their surplus increased by
$366.37 million in the softwood market, $297.46 million in the hardwood market and
$633.82 million in both markets (Table 4.6).
Although timber supply from public timberland was assumed constant over time,
the government benefitted from higher timber prices. For annual average timberland
transactions among other producers, the government surplus increased by $1.87 million,
$1.61 million, and $3.47 million, respectively, in softwood, hardwood and both markets.
For total timberland transactions among other landowners, government surplus increased
by $37.46 million in the softwood market, $32.10 million in the hardwood market and
$69.56 million in both market (Table 4.6).
Unlike the government, consumers faced reduced consumer surplus in timber
markets. Their surplus reduction was $21.46 million in the softwood markets, $19.79
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million in the hardwood markets and $41.25 million in both markets based on annual
average rate of timberland transactions among landowners. When total land transactions
were considered, their consumer surplus decreased by $428.89 million, $394.27 million
and $725.67 million, respectively, in softwood, hardwood, and combined markets (Table
4.6).
Total surplus or social surplus decreased primarily due to the reduction in timber
supply. This reduction was attributed to net reduction of the timberland base through
nonforestry uses of timberland (HBUs) and a reduced timber supply held back from the
markets by conservation groups since their primary objective of owning timberland is
environmental conservation. Based on the annual average timberland transaction rate,
total surplus reductions were $25.81 million, $17.53 million, and $43.34 million,
respectively, in softwood, hardwood and both markets. When total land transactions
among all landowners were considered, total surplus decreased by $448.89 million in the
softwood market, $276.77 million in the hardwood market, and $725.67 million in both
markets (Table 4.6).

4.4.2.2 Sensitivity results
Results of the sensitivity analysis of surplus change estimates for producers and
consumers are presented in Table 4.7 and in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. When stochastic
parameters were simulated, the absolute mean values of producer (as a group) surplus,
consumer surplus and total surplus increased by 43%, 26%, and 26%, respectively,
compared to the original absolute surplus change in combined hardwood and softwood
timber markets based on annual average land transactions. For total land transactions, the
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absolute mean for producer surplus increased by 15% and both consumer and producer
surpluses by 26%, when compared to the original absolute surplus changes. Based on
annual average timberland transactions, surplus change for producers as a group,
consumers, and society as a whole ranged between -$12.8 and $5.4 million, -$12.8 and
$5.4 million, and -$109.4 and -$10.3 million, respectively. For total land transactions,
surplus changes varied between -$112 and $369 million for the producer group, -$2019
and -$145 million for consumers, and -$1772 and -$175 million for society.

Table 4.7 Sensitivity of changes in producer, consumer, and total surpluses in U.S.
timber markets based on total and annual average timberland ownership
change rates from 1987 through 2006.
Landbase
Change

Total

Annual

Surplus change (million U.S. dollars) a

Markets

Public
48.62
(6,106)i

IC d
-35.13
(-78,-5)

Producers
NIC e
473.67
(62,1030)

HW c

38.97
(-16,106)

-12.70
(-34,5)

Both

87.59
(14,171)

-47.83
(-94,-10)

SW

2.43
(0.3,5.4)

HW

1.94
(-0.8,5.4)

SW b

Both

Consumers

Total h

NIPF f
-514.26
(-1138,-67)

Net g
-27.10
(-130,43)

-555.58
(-1210,-71)

-582.68
(-1282,-75)

357.81
(-148,975)

-245.22
(-678,98)

138.86
(-59,386)

-477.41
(-1300,193)

-338.54
(-932,133)

831.48
(137,1607)

-759.49
(-1472,-160)

111.76
(-112,369)

-1032.98
(-2019,-145)

-921.22
(-1772,-175)

-2.28
(-5.1,-0.3)

20.82
(2.8,46.2)

-26.67
(-59.4,-3.5)

-5.70
(-14.4,-0.5)

-27.92
(-61.8,-3.7)

-33.62
(-74.9,-4.4)

-1.08
(-3.0,0.4)

14.60
(-5.7,40.6)

-12.75
(-35.6,5.0)

2.71
(-1.0,8.8)

-23.89
(-66.1,9.3)

-21.18
(-58.9,8.2)

-51.81
(-104.7,-7.8)

-54.80
(-109.4,10.3)

4.37

-3.36

35.41

-39.42

-2.99

(0.7,8.8)

(-6.7,-0.7)

(6.2,70.9)

(-79.2,-8.4)

(-12.8,5.4)

a

All values are based on 2006 timber prices and supplies; b SW=Softwood market; c
HW=Hardwood market; d IC=Industrial corporate landowners; e NIC=Nonindustrial
corporate landowners; f NIPF=Nonindustrial private forest landowners; g Sum of all
owners’ producer surpluses; h Data may not add to total due to rounding; i Values in the
parentheses are the 95% confidence intervals around respective means.
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Figure 4.2 Probability density functions for changes in producer, consumer and social
surplus (million U.S. dollars) in U.S. timber markets due to timberland
ownership changes. Changes are estimated based on annual average acreage
of timberland transacted among landowners from 1987 to 2006, 2006 timber
supplies (MMBF), and timber prices (dollars per MBF). Values on the
horizontal axes indicate 95% confidence intervals around the means of the
surplus changes for respective parties.
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Figure 4.3 Probability density functions for changes in producer, consumer and social
surplus (million U.S. dollars) in U.S. timber markets due to timberland
ownership changes. Changes are estimated based on total acreage of
timberland transacted among landowners from 1987 to 2006, 2006 timber
supplies (MMBF), and timber price (dollars per MBF). Values on the
horizontal axis indicate 95% confidence intervals around the means of
surplus changes for respective parties.

4.5 Discussion and conclusions
This study quantitatively examined the economic surplus changes borne by
timberland owners and consumers for changes in timberland ownership from 1987
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through 2006. For many reasons including a double tax burden, industrial corporate
timberland owners sold about 70% of their timberland during this period. Since
industrial timberlands were divested, the industrial share of timber supplies reduced
considerably. Nonindustrial corporate landowners’ share of timber supply increased
since they acquired most of the timberlands divested by industrial corporate landowners.
NIPF supply share decreased since NIPF timberland base decreased from 283.56 million
ac in 1987 to 255.00 million ac in 2006 (Powell et al. 1993; Smith et al. 2010). Some
timberland was sold to conservation groups whose main objective for owning timberland
was environmental conservation, rather than timber production. Again some timberland
went out of timber production as HBU parcels. This resulted in a net decrease in timber
supply in the U.S. timber markets and increased timber prices. These two effects
together changed the economic surplus of all parties involved in timber markets.
Producer surplus for industrial corporate landowners and NIPF landowners decreased
after they divested their timberlands. Producer surplus for nonindustrial corporate
landowners, on the other hand, increased since they increased their timberlands through
purchasing from other owners.
Producer surplus for nonindustrial corporate landowners increased for two
reasons: (1) their timberland base increased considerably through land purchases which
increased their timber supply and, (2) increased timber prices due to a net decrease in
timber supply to the U.S. timber markets. Although timber supply from public ownership
was assumed constant during the study period, producer surplus share for government
increased due to increased timber price. Although consumers were not any part of
timberland ownership changes, they were adversely affected due to increased timber
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prices and they faced the largest consequences among all involved in the timber markets.
Their surplus was reduced by a large margin due to increased timber price. Although
producer surplus increased for some landowners (nonindustrial corporate timberland
owners and public ownership), decreased for some landowners (industrial corporate,
NIPF landowners), consumer surplus decreased, overall social surplus decreased due to
net reduction in timber supply in U.S. timber markets. This reduction is attributed to
reduction of timberland base through nonforestry uses of timberlands and a reduced
timber supply held back from the markets by conservation groups since their primary
objective of owning timberland is environmental conservation.
The overall impact of timberland ownership change was small on U.S. timber
markets. The price increase over the 20 year divestiture period was $3.64 per MBF (i.e.,
$0.18 per MBF per year) for softwoods and $5.81 per MBF (i.e., $0.29 per MBF per
year) for hardwoods. Based on total acreage of timberland transactions among
landowners over the divestiture period, timberland ownership change did cost society
about $726 million as total social surplus reduction. Based on the 2006 U.S. average for
softwood and hardwood prices and timber supply data (Smith et al. 2010), the U.S.
timber market size was estimated as $33.3 billion in 2006. And, estimated total social
surplus reduction was about $43 million in the same year. Thus, the social surplus
reduction was quite small compared to total timber market size.
This study explains the mechanism of surplus shifts among producers and
consumers, and quantifies the surplus changes for each of the landowners attributed to
timberland ownership changes in the U.S. from 1987 to 2006. It also evaluates how
consumers and society face consequences for timberland ownership changes. While
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government loses tax income from timberlands being owned by S corporations like
TIMOs and REITs for their lower tax rates, it earns a positive producer surplus change
due to higher timber price. However, this study has not investigated the balance between
the two. It is a step forward to justify industrial timberland divestiture decisions.
In comparison to the potential benefits from divesting industrial timberlands,
reduction in industrial producer surplus is trivial. A double tax burden on timber profits,
poor shareholder returns, and interest on loan were some of the financial liabilities being
incurred by corporate timberland owners. Through divestiture of these lands, they rid
themselves of these burdens. Potential benefits from divesting timberlands include
profits from timberland sales, avoidance of double taxation, and increased capital
availability. However, these options were not taken into consideration in this study. The
economic surplus losses for industrial corporate owners were generated solely by
reduction of timberland base of these owners through divestitures. Further investigations
may be carried out to include all of these factors to further resolve the issue of whether
industrial timberland divestiture was at all a profitable option for industrial corporate
timberland owners.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

There were unprecedented changes in timberland ownership in the last two
decades. Many firms in the U.S. forest products industry either divested their
timberlands to TIMOs and conservation organizations or changed their corporate
structures from C corporations to REIT structures. Double taxation was one of the most
important reasons for industrial corporate landowners to sell their timberland. The
largest group of buyers was nonindustrial corporate timberland investors. Another buyer
was the conservation groups. Again, all owners sold some parcels of timberland to
developers who converted those parcels to HBUs. This study has explored two
consequences of this large scale timberland transaction: (1) financial performance of
forest product firms that were either involved in timberland transactions or REITconversions, and (2) social welfare implications due to net reduction of timber supply
attributed to HBUs of timberland and less intensive timber management by conservation
groups compared to industrial owners. These issues have been analyzed, respectively, in
Chapters III and IV.
Chapter III findings improve our understanding on how a firm’s market value was
affected by its declaration of selling or buying timberlands or converting to a REIT
structure. Based on capital market responses to firms involved in timberland
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transactions, it can be recommended that, investing in timberland was financially a better
option than selling timberlands. Again, capital markets responded to REIT-conversion
with financial improvement of all REITs as a group. This study has identified a two-fold
benefit in REIT-conversions: improved financial performance and greater control on
timber management and supplies ensured by timberland ownerships. Again, timberland
transaction cost relative to the size of the firm total assets had an important role on a
firm’s financial position in the capital market. Although buying firms’ financial
performance was better than that of selling firms, the systematic risk was not associated
to whether a firm was a buyer or a seller. Therefore, systematic risk was not linked to
buying or selling timberland.
Thus, this study may assist timberland owners in taking the right direction on
whether to sell timberlands or convert their corporate structures from C to S corporations.
Furthermore, the study findings may be used to post evaluate timberland divesting
decisions by the industrial corporate landowners. Although the findings suggest that the
declaration of REIT-conversion instantly improved a firm’s capital market performance,
one cannot wholly rely on this result since there were only four publicly traded timber
REITs in the capital markets. Results based on financial analysis of only four REITs
might not reflect the true financial directions. Since it is possible that additional private
firms might covert to private REITs in future, this study may be replicated including all
those future REITs to better predict the financial directions for timber REITs.
While capital market responses to timberland transaction announcement were
immediate and for short-term, long-term impacts of landownership changes on timber
supply, timber price, and social welfare were also obvious. Chapter IV findings explain
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how economic surplus shifted among producers and consumers in the U.S. timber market
related to changes in timberland ownership. Timberland ownership changes caused a net
reduction of timber supplies in the U.S. timber market, and in turn, increased timber
prices. However, timber price increase was relatively small; thus, illustrating the stability
of the U.S. timber markets. Overall surplus reduction in the U.S. timber markets for the
society as a whole was relatively small compared to the $33 billion U.S. timber market.
Chapter IV findings were also subject to a number of limiting factors as several
assumptions were made to complete the study. Also, the elasticity parameters were dated
and collected from secondary sources. Thus, a sensitivity analysis was needed to obtain
95% confidence intervals around the mean surplus changes. Dated timber supply
elasticity values for all landowners need to be updated; timber supply elasticity values for
nonindustrial corporate landowners need to be determined to obtain more correct surplus
change estimates for all landowners and consumers.
While government producer surplus increased due to increased timber prices, it
might lose potential tax income since S corporations like TIMOs and REITs are required
to pay lower tax rate compared to that of corporate industrial timberland owners.
However, this study did not investigate the balance between the gains and losses borne by
the public ownership attributed to timberland ownership changes. Although the potential
benefits from divesting industrial timberlands are presumably higher than the reduction
of industrial landowner producer surplus, it was not established in this study. Further
investigation combining all possible benefits from industrial timberland divestiture is
needed to better determine whether industrial timberland divestiture is a robust financial
decision.
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APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF EQUATIONS IN CHAPTER IV
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U.S. timber markets can be modeled as follows:
Timber supply by industrial corporate owners

Qi

f ( P, Li )

[A.1]

Timber supply by NIPF landowners

Qn

g ( P, Ln )

[A.2]

Timber supply by nonindustrial corporate and other owners Qr

h( P, Lr )

[A.3]

Qi  Qn  Qr  Qg [A.4]

Aggregate timber supply

Qs

Aggregate timber demand

Qd

k ( P)

[A.5]

Market clearance

Qd

Qs

[A.6]

The assumption of direct linear relationship between the size of the landbase,
inventory and timber supply indicates that, for owner for owner m (where m is i, n, r ,
and g )
Lm

tI m

[A.7]

where t is a proportional constant. By total differentiation, equation [A.7] yields [A.8],

dLm tdI m

[A.8]

The above equation system ([A.1] through [A.6]) can be totally differentiated as
follows.
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[A.9]

[A.10]

[A.11]

[A.12]
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[A.13]

[A.14]

There is an implicit relationship among all timberland owners; the sum of all
timberland owned and the HBU parcels equals the total timberland. Thus the relationship
can be expressed as,
L

Li  Ln  Lr  Lg  LHBU

[A.15]

Equation [A.15] on total differentiation, gives [A.16].

[A.16]

Using each of lHBU , L, and Lg equal to zero, equation [A.16] reduces to [A.17],

Lr



Li li  Lnln
lr

[A.17]

Again, since timber supply from public forest land is not affected either by market
forces or by the timber tax policy, Qg should be zero. Given these and substituting
equations [A.9], [A.10] and [A.11] into [A.12],
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[A.18]

Substituting equations [A.18] and [A.13], into [A.14], and solving for P , yields
equation [A.19].

[A.19]

Substituting [A.19] into [A.13] and solving for Q ,
§ Ll  L l ·
O[i i Li  On[n Ln  Or[r ¨ i i n n ¸
© lr ¹
Q Ku
K  OiH i  OnH n  OrH r

[A.20]

Vertical shift in supply is equivalent to a percentage change in price holding the
quantity supplied constant (i.e. Vs equates P |Qs 0 ). As measured by Sun and Kinnucn
(2001), vertical shift in supply was calculated with equation [A.21].

Vs

§ Ll  L l ·
Oi[i Li  On[ n Ln  Or[ r ¨ i i n n ¸
lr
©
¹

OiH i  OnH n  Or H r

[A.21]

Again, following Sun and Kinnucn (2001) and Brown and Zhang (2005), and
using Figure 4.1, economic surplus changes due to supply shifts were calculated using
equations [A.22] through [A.26].
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[A.22]

[A.23]

Following the procedure used in deriving equation [A.22],
[A.24]
[A.25]
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[A.26]
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R PROGRAM CODES FOR CHAPTER III
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##************************EVENT STUDY********************************##
############ Table of Content for Event Study R program code###########
### 0. Running necessary Libraries
### 1. Import Data
### 2. Abnormal Return
### 3. Cross Sectional Regression
### 4. Risk Analysis
### 5. Output Tables
### 6. Source Code for Abnormal Return calculation
### 7. Source Code for Risk Analysis
##*******************************************************************##
####################
0. Running necessary libraries##################
getwd();setwd("C:/R directory"); getwd()
library(RODBC)
library(tseries)
####################

1.

I m p o r t

D a t a

###################

input <- odbcConnectExcel2007('Garch 1 data and result.xlsx')
sheet <- sqlTables(input); sheet$TABLE_NAME
ticker <- sqlFetch(input, "ticker")
event <- sqlFetch(input, "a_event")
raw
<- sqlFetch(input, "b_data")
tbill <- sqlFetch(input, "c_tbill")
asset <- sqlFetch(input, "d_asset")
odbcClose(input)
dim(raw); names(raw); head(raw); tail(raw)
dim(tbill); names(tbill); head(tbill); tail(tbill)
event; ticker; asset
#####################

2.

A b n o r m a l

R e t u r n ###########

rpert <- data.frame(raw[,"date"], raw[,-1]*100); colnames(rpert) <colnames(raw); head(rpert)
t.date <as.numeric(paste(as.character(format(tbill$date,format="%Y")),
as.character(format(tbill$date,format="%m")),
as.character(format(tbill$date,format="%d")), sep=''))
trate <- data.frame(date=t.date, tbill=tbill[,-1])
rpt <- merge(x=rpert, y=trate, all.x=TRUE); dim(rpt); head(rpt)
### 76 t-bill values are missing and replaced by the previous value ###
su(as.numeric(is.na(rpt[, "tbill"])))
r100 <- rpt
for ( j in 1:nrow(r100) ) {
if ( is.na(r100[j, "tbill"]) ) {
r100[j, "tbill"] <- r100[j-1, "tbill"]
}
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}
sum(as.numeric(is.na(r100[, "tbill"])))
date <- as.numeric(paste(as.character(format(event$Date,format="%Y")),
as.character(format(event$Date,format="%m")),
as.character(format(event$Date,format="%d")),
sep=''))
evt <- data.frame(date, event[,-2])
sel <- subset(evt[,c("date", "Seller", "Payment_million_dollar",
"whole")], evt$Seller != "NA")
buy <- subset(evt[,c("date", "Buyer", "Payment_million_dollar",
"whole")], evt$Buyer != "NA" )
rei <- subset(evt[,c("date", "Reit")],
evt$Reit != "NA")
rownames(sel) <- 1:nrow(sel)
rownames(buy) <- 1:nrow(buy)
rownames(rei) <- 1:nrow(rei)
buy2 <- buy; colnames(buy2) <- c("date", "all", "payment", "whole")
sel2 <- sel; colnames(sel2) <- c("date", "all", "payment", "whole")
tot <- rbind(sel2, buy2)
sel; buy; tot; rei
source('evAbre.r')
f1 <- evAbre(y=r100,
f2 <- evAbre(y=r100,
f3 <- evAbre(y=r100,
f4 <- evAbre(y=r100,

party=sel,
party=buy,
party=tot,
party=rei,

wid.est=250,
wid.est=250,
wid.est=250,
wid.est=250,

wid.eve=15,
wid.eve=15,
wid.eve=15,
wid.eve=15,

digit=5)
digit=5)
digit=5)
digit=5)

f3$abret; f1$out; f3$CNT
f4$abret; f4$out; f4$CNT
######### Fig 3.1 #####################################################
gg <- data.frame(f1$abret$hret, f2$abret$hret, f3$abret$hret)
colnames(gg) <- c("h.buyer","h.seller","h.total")
(x.ma <- c( -(f1$wid.eve:1), 0, 1:f1$wid.eve) )
(gg <- data.frame(gg, x.ma))
win.graph(width=6, height=4, pointsize=10); par(family="serif")
bringToTop(stay=TRUE)
plot(gg[,1] ~ x.ma, data=gg, type="l",
xlab = "Event window",
ylab = "Average cumulative abnormal return (%)",
ylim = c( min(gg[,-4]), max(gg[,-4]) ) )
abline(h=0)
lines(gg[,2] ~ x.ma, data=gg)
lines(gg[,3] ~ x.ma, data=gg)
points(gg[,1] ~ x.ma, data=gg, pch=0)
points(gg[,2] ~ x.ma, data=gg, pch=1)
points(gg[,3] ~ x.ma, data=gg, pch=2)
legend(-5, 5, c("Selling firms", "Buying firms", "All firms"),
text.col = "black", bg = 'white',xjust = 1, yjust = 1, cex=1,
pch=0:2)
######### Fig 3.2 #####################################################
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(hh <- f4$abret)
hh$h.pch <- cumsum(hh$pch); hh$h.ryn <- cumsum(hh$ryn)
hh$h.lfb <- cumsum(hh$lfb); hh$h.pcl <- cumsum(hh$pcl)
h.reit <- hh[,c("h.pch","h.ryn","h.lfb","h.pcl","hret")]
(x.reit <- c(-(f4$wid.eve:1), 0, 1:f4$wid.eve) )
(h.reit <- data.frame(h.reit, x.reit))
win.graph(width=6, height=4, pointsize=10); par(family="serif")
bringToTop(stay=TRUE)
plot(h.reit[,1] ~ x.reit, data=h.reit, type="l",
xlab = "Event window",
ylab = "Average cumulative abnormal return (%)",
ylim = c( min(h.reit[,-6]), max(h.reit[,-6]) ) )
abline(h=0)
lines(h.reit[,2] ~ x.reit, data=h.reit)
lines(h.reit[,3] ~ x.reit, data=h.reit)
lines(h.reit[,4] ~ x.reit, data=h.reit)
lines(h.reit[,5] ~ x.reit, data=h.reit)
points(h.reit[,1] ~ x.reit, data=h.reit, pch=0)
points(h.reit[,2] ~ x.reit, data=h.reit, pch=1)
points(h.reit[,3] ~ x.reit, data=h.reit, pch=2)
points(h.reit[,4] ~ x.reit, data=h.reit, pch=5)
points(h.reit[,5] ~ x.reit, data=h.reit, pch=16)
legend(-5, -6, c("Potlatch (PCH)", "Rayonier (RYN)", "Longview Fiber
(LFB)",
"Plum Creek (PCL)", "All REITs"),
text.col = "black", bg = 'white',xjust = 1, yjust = 1, cex=0.8,
pch=c(0, 1, 2, 5, 16))
######### All combined ################################################
nwin <- c(1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15)
out.name <- c("wid.length", "model", "seller.cum", "seller.z",
"buyer.cum", "buyer.z", "all.cum", "all.z", "reit.cum", "reit.z")
out <- data.frame(matrix(0, nrow=length(nwin), ncol=length(out.name)))
colnames(out) <- out.name
csa <- data.frame(matrix(0, nrow=nrow(tot), ncol=length(nwin) ))
colnames(csa) <- paste("CiT_", (nwin*2 + 1), sep="")
sel3 <- cbind(sel2, "seller", 0)
buy3 <- cbind(buy2, "buyer", 1)
colnames(sel3) <- c("date", "name", "payment", "whole", "party",
"party.d")
colnames(buy3) <- c("date", "name", "payment", "whole", "party",
"party.d")
csb <- data.frame(rbind(sel3, buy3))
cs <- data.frame(csa,csb)
for ( i in 1:length(nwin) ) {
u1 <- evAbre(y=r100, party=sel, wid.eve=nwin[i],
u2 <- evAbre(y=r100, party=buy, wid.eve=nwin[i],
u3 <- evAbre(y=r100, party=tot, wid.eve=nwin[i],
u4 <- evAbre(y=r100, party=rei, wid.eve=nwin[i],
out[i, "wid.length"] <- u1$wid.length
out[i, "model"]
<- u1$model
out[i, "seller.cum"] <- u1$CNT[1,1]
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digit=5)
digit=5)
digit=5)
digit=5)

out[i, "seller.z"]
<- u1$CNT[1,3]
out[i, "buyer.cum"] <- u2$CNT[1,1]
out[i, "buyer.z"]
<- u2$CNT[1,3]
out[i, "all.cum"]
<- u3$CNT[1,1]
out[i, "all.z"]
<- u3$CNT[1,3]
out[i, "reit.cum"]
<- u4$CNT[1,1]
out[i, "reit.z"]
<- u4$CNT[1,3]
cs[, i] <- u3$out$cu.ret
}
tab.abret <- out
######

3.

C r o s s

S e c t i o n

R e g

######################

cs$billion <- as.numeric(cs$payment > 100)
cs$time <- as.numeric(substr(cs$date, 1, 4)) - 1985
a.date <as.numeric(paste(as.character(format(asset$date,format="%Y")),
as.character(format(asset$date,format="%m")),
as.character(format(asset$date,format="%d")), sep=''))
asset2 <- data.frame(date=a.date, asset[,-1])
asset3 <- merge(asset2, cs, by.x=c("date","ticker","position"),
by.y=c("date","name","party"))
asset3$size <- asset3$payment / asset3$total_asset
(d.asset <- asset3[, -c(3,4,6,13)])
cs.out <- data.frame(matrix(0, nrow=7, ncol=3*6))
for ( i in 1:length(nwin) ) {
dept <- paste("CiT_", (nwin[i]*2 + 1), sep="")
formula <- as.formula(paste(dept, "~ whole + time + ROA + size +
party.d + billion", sep=""))
cs.reg <- lm(formula, data=d.asset)
xvar
<- rownames(data.frame(summary(cs.reg)["coefficients"]))
cs.out[, 3*i-2] <round(data.frame(summary(cs.reg)["coefficients"])[,1], 3)
cs.out[, 3*i-1] <round(data.frame(summary(cs.reg)["coefficients"])[,3], 3)
pcs <- data.frame(summary(cs.reg)["coefficients"])[,4]
cs.out[, 3*i] <- ifelse(pcs <= 0.01, "***",
ifelse(pcs > 0.01 & pcs <= 0.05, "**",
ifelse(pcs > 0.05 & pcs <= 0.10, "*", " ")))
colnames(cs.out)[3*i-2] <- paste(dept, ".v", sep="")
colnames(cs.out)[3*i-1] <- paste(dept, ".t", sep="")
colnames(cs.out)[3*i]
<- paste(dept, ".g", sep="")
}
formula; summary(cs.reg)
(tab.cs <- data.frame(xvar, cs.out))
######

4.

R i s k

A n a l y s i s

#############################

source("evRisk.r")
r1 <- evRisk(y=r100, party=tot, window=50 )
r2 <- evRisk(y=r100, party=tot, window=100)
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r3 <- evRisk(y=r100, party=tot, window=150)
r4 <- evRisk(y=r100, party=tot, window=200)
riskout <- data.frame(r1$out[,c(1,2,6,8,9,11)], r2$out[,c(6,8,9,11)],
r3$out[,c(6,8,9,11)], r4$out[,c(6,8,9,11)])
colnames(riskout) <- c("firm", "date",
"b50", "bs50", "r50", "rs50", "b100", "bs100", "r100", "rs100",
"b150", "bs150", "r150", "rs150", "b200", "bs200", "r200", "rs200"
)
tab.ris <- riskout[, c("firm", "date",
"b50", "b100", "b150", "b200", "bs50", "bs100", "bs150",
"bs200",
"r50", "r100", "r150", "r200", "rs50", "rs100", "rs150", "rs200"
)]
riskout
tab.ris
######

5.

O u t p u t

############################################

tab.abret
tab.cs
tab.ris
write.table(file="Garch 3
row.names=F, tab.abret)
write.table(file="Garch 3
row.names=F, tab.cs)
write.table(file="Garch 3
row.names=F, tab.ris)
write.table(file="Garch 3
row.names=F, f1$data.est)

R Result.csv", sep=",", append=F,
R Result.csv", sep=",", append=T,
R Result.csv", sep=",", append=T,
R Result.csv", sep=",", append=T,

############ 6. S o u r c e code for abnormal return calculation ######
evAbre <- function(y, party, model="OLS", wid.est=250, wid.eve=3,
digit=3, index="sp500") {
out.name <- c("N", "firm", "event.date",
"alpha","tval.a","sig.a", "beta","tval.b","sig.b",
"cu.ret", "cu.ret.var", "cu.ret.t", "cu.ret.p", "cu.ret.sig")
out <- data.frame(matrix(0, nrow=nrow(party),
ncol=length(out.name)))
colnames(out) <- out.name
abret <- data.frame( matrix(0, nrow=wid.eve*2 + 1,
ncol=nrow(party)+1 ) )
colnames(abret) <- c(as.character(party[, 2]), "all.average")
for (i in 1:nrow(party) ) {
firm <- as.character(party[i, 2])
date.eve <- party[i,1]
loca <- as.numeric(rownames(subset(y, y$date==date.eve)))
d.est <- y[(loca - wid.eve - wid.est):(loca - wid.eve - 1),
c("date", firm, index)]
d.eve <- y[(loca - wid.eve):(loca + wid.eve),
c("date", firm, index )]
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if ( sum(as.numeric(is.na(d.est))) > 0 ) {stop(paste("\nNote:
Some observations in the",
"estimation window for firm --", firm, "-- are
NA.\n\n", sep=" "))}
if ( sum(as.numeric(is.na(d.eve))) > 0 ) {stop(paste("\nNote:
Some observations in the",
"event window for firm --", firm, "-- are NA.\n\n",
sep=" "))}
reg <- lm(as.formula(paste(firm, index, sep="~")), data=d.est)
out[i,"N"]
<- i
out[i,"firm"]
<- firm
out[i,"event.date"] <- date.eve
out[i,"alpha"]
<round(data.frame(summary(reg)["coefficients"])[1,1], digit)
out[i,"tval.a"]
<round(data.frame(summary(reg)["coefficients"])[1,3], digit)
out[i,"beta"]
<round(data.frame(summary(reg)["coefficients"])[2,1], digit)
out[i,"tval.b"]
<round(data.frame(summary(reg)["coefficients"])[2,3], digit)
pa <- data.frame(summary(reg)["coefficients"])[1,4]
pb <- data.frame(summary(reg)["coefficients"])[2,4]
out[i,"sig.a"] <- ifelse(pa <= 0.01, "***",
ifelse(pa > 0.01 & pa <= 0.05, "**",
ifelse(pa > 0.05 & pa <= 0.10, "*", " ")))
out[i,"sig.b"] <- ifelse(pb <= 0.01, "***",
ifelse(pb > 0.01 & pb <= 0.05, "**",
ifelse(pb > 0.05 & pb <= 0.10, "*", " ")))
abret[,i] <- as.matrix(d.eve[,firm]) data.frame(summary(reg)["coefficients"])[1,1] data.frame(summary(reg)["coefficients"])[2,1] *
as.matrix(d.eve[,index])
out[i, "cu.ret"]
<- sum(abret[,i])
out[i, "cu.ret.var"] <- nrow(d.eve) *
(as.numeric(summary(reg)["sigma"]))^2
out[i, "cu.ret.t"]
<- out[i, "cu.ret"] / sqrt(out[i,
"cu.ret.var"])
out[i, "cu.ret.p"]
<- 1 - pt(abs(out[i, "cu.ret.t"]),
nrow(d.eve))
out[i, "cu.ret.sig"] <- ifelse(out[i, "cu.ret.p"] <= 0.01,
"***",
ifelse(out[i, "cu.ret.p"] > 0.01 &
out[i, "cu.ret.p"] <= 0.05,
"**",
ifelse(out[i, "cu.ret.p"] > 0.05 &
out[i, "cu.ret.p"] <= 0.10, "*",
" ")))
}
cum
<- round(mean(out[,"cu.ret"]), digit)
cum.v <- sum(out[, "cu.ret.var"]) / (nrow(party))^2
cum.z <- round(cum / sqrt(cum.v), digit)
CNT <- data.frame(cum, cum.v, cum.z)

103

for (j in 1:nrow(party) ) { abret$all.average <- abret$all.average
+ abret[,j] }
abret$all.average <- abret$all.average / nrow(party)
abret$hret <- cumsum(abret$all.average)
wid.length <- wid.eve*2+1
result <- list(y=y, data.est=d.est, data.event=d.eve, party=party,
model=model,
wid.est=wid.est, wid.eve=wid.eve, wid.length=wid.length,
abret=abret, out=out, CNT=CNT )
class(result) <- "evAbre"
return(result)
}
################### 7. S o u r c e code for risk analysis #############
evRisk <- function(y, party, window=50, digit=3, index="sp500",
r.free="tbill") {
out.name <- c("firm", "event.date", "alpha","tval.a","sig.a",
"beta","tval.b","sig.b", "gama","tval.r","sig.r")
out <- data.frame(matrix(0, nrow=nrow(party),
ncol=length(out.name)))
colnames(out) <- out.name
for (i in 1:nrow(party) ) {
firm <- as.character(party[i, 2])
date.event <- party[i,1]
loca <- as.numeric(rownames(subset(y, y$date==date.event)))
d.est <- y[(loca - window):(loca + window), c("date", firm,
index, r.free)]
rownames(d.est) <- 1:length((loca - window):(loca + window))
if ( sum(as.numeric(is.na(d.est))) > 0 ) {stop(paste("\nNote:
Some observations in the",
"estimation window for firm --", firm, "-- are
NA.\n\n", sep=" "))}
d.est$firm.s
d.est$index.a
d.est$dummy
window+1 )
d.est$index.b

<- d.est[, firm] - d.est[, r.free]
<- d.est[, index] - d.est[, r.free]
<- as.numeric( as.numeric(rownames(d.est)) >
<- d.est$dummy * d.est$index.a

reg <- lm(as.formula(firm.s ~ index.a + index.b), data=d.est)
out[i,"firm"]
<- firm
out[i,"event.date"] <- date.event
out[i,"alpha"]
<round(data.frame(summary(reg)["coefficients"])[1,1],
out[i,"tval.a"]
<round(data.frame(summary(reg)["coefficients"])[1,3],
out[i,"beta"]
<round(data.frame(summary(reg)["coefficients"])[2,1],
out[i,"tval.b"]
<round(data.frame(summary(reg)["coefficients"])[2,3],
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digit)
digit)
digit)
digit)

out[i,"gama"]
<round(data.frame(summary(reg)["coefficients"])[3,1], digit)
out[i,"tval.r"]
<round(data.frame(summary(reg)["coefficients"])[3,3], digit)
pa <- data.frame(summary(reg)["coefficients"])[1,4]
pb <- data.frame(summary(reg)["coefficients"])[2,4]
pr <- data.frame(summary(reg)["coefficients"])[3,4]
out[i,"sig.a"] <- ifelse(pa
ifelse(pa
ifelse(pa
out[i,"sig.b"] <- ifelse(pb
ifelse(pb
ifelse(pb
out[i,"sig.r"] <- ifelse(pr
ifelse(pr
ifelse(pr

<=
>
>
<=
>
>
<=
>
>

0.01, "***",
0.01 & pa <=
0.05 & pa <=
0.01, "***",
0.01 & pb <=
0.05 & pb <=
0.01, "***",
0.01 & pr <=
0.05 & pr <=

0.05, "**",
0.10, "*", " ")))
0.05, "**",
0.10, "*", " ")))
0.05, "**",
0.10, "*", " ")))

}
result <- list(y=y, data.est=d.est, date.event=date.event,
party=party, window=window, out=out)
class(result) <- "evRisk"
return(result)
}
##########################***E***N***D***##############################
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APPENDIX C
R PROGRAM CODES FOR CHAPTER IV
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##***************************EDM STUDY*******************************##
############# Table of Content for EDM Study R program code############
###
###
###
###
###
###
###
###
###
###
###
###
###
###
###
###
###

0.0
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5

Running necessary Libraries
R code for Figure 4.1
Graph Frame
Demand curve and axes
Supply curve segments
Price and Quantity line segments
Vertex of quadrilaterals
Names of line segments
Quantity shifts
Price shifts
Shift indicating arrow
calling source code
Data Input
Calculation of market displacement
Welfare change calculation
Derivations of 95% CI
Derivation of pdf

####*******************************************************************
#####################1. R code for Figure 4.1 #########################
######################Step 1.1: Graph frame############################
win.graph(width=5,height=5,pointsize=9)
bringToTop(stay=TRUE)
par(mai=c(0.3,0.3,0.3,0.3),family="serif")
########################Step 1.2: Demand curve, axes###################
x=c(0,3)
y=c(3,0)
plot(x,y, type="l", axes=F, ann=F, col="red")
abline(v=0, h=0.1)
######################Step 1.3: Supply curve segments##################
#locator(n) cn be used to find a point where n is the #of points
segments(0.25,0.1, 0.25,3)
segments(0,2, 1,2.5); segments(0,2.2, 0.9,2.65)
segments(0,1.4, 1.5,2); segments(0,1.5, 1.4,2.06)
segments(0,1.1, 1.7,1.695); segments(0,0.97, 1.8,1.6)
segments(0,0.2, 2.5,0.95); segments(0,0.35, 2.4,1.07)
# Above lines can be drawn using abline(a=intercept, b=slope) command
as follows:
#[#abline(v=0, h=0); #abline (v=.25)
#abline(a=2.0,b=0.5); #abline(a=2.2,b=0.5)
#abline(a=1.4,b=0.4); #abline(a=1.5,b=0.4)
#abline(a=1.1,b=0.35)
#abline(a=.2,b=0.3); #abline(a=.35,b=0.3)]
#####################Step 1.4: Price and Quantity line segments########
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segments(0.54,2.46, 0.54,0.1, col="blue", lty="12")
segments(0.54,2.46, 0,2.46, col="blue", lty="12")
segments(0.675,2.53, 0,2.53, col="blue", lty="12")
segments(0.675,2.34, 0,2.34, col="blue", lty="12")
segments(0.675,2.53, 0.675,0.1, col="blue", lty="12")
segments(1.15,
segments(1.15,
segments(1.06,
segments(1.06,
segments(1.06,

1.85, 0,1.85, col="blue", lty="12")
1.85, 1.15,0.1, col="blue", lty="12")
1.928, 0,1.928, col="blue", lty="12")
1.928, 1.06,0.1, col="blue", lty="12")
1.82, 0,1.82, col="blue", lty="12")

segments(1.41,1.59,
segments(1.50,1.62,
segments(1.41,1.59,
segments(1.50,1.62,

1.41,0.1, col="blue", lty="12")
1.50,0.1, col="blue", lty="12")
0,1.59, col="blue", lty="12")
0,1.62, col="blue", lty="12")

segments(2.04,.965, 0,0.965, col="blue", lty="12")
segments(2.04,.965, 2.04,0.1, col="blue", lty="12")
segments(2.16,.85, 0,.85, col="blue", lty="12")
segments(2.16,.85, 2.16,0.1, col="blue", lty="12")
######################Step 1.5: Vertices of quadrilaterals#############
g<c(0.7,0.05,0.05,0.6,0.05,2.1,2.25,0.04,0.04,1.22,1.1,0.04,0.04,0.04,0.0
4)
h<-c(2.6,2.6,2.42,2.45,2.20,
0.95,0.83,0.81,0.93,1.85,1.8,1.78,1.9,3.04,1.38)
text(g,h,c("y'","z'","z","y","x","n","n'","m'","m","v","v'","w'","w","o
","u"))
####################Step 1.6: Names of line segments ##################
#To get help on Mathematical Annotations go: ?plotmath
text(locator(1),expression(S[G]^0))
text(locator(1),expression(S[i]^a));text(locator(1),expression(S[i]^0))
text(locator(1),expression(S[r]^0));text(locator(1),expression(S[r]^a))
text(locator(1),expression(S[n]^a))
text(locator(1),expression(S[n]^0))
text(locator(1),expression(S[total]^a));text(locator(1),expression(S[to
tal]^0))
text(locator(1),expression(D))
#####################Step 1.7: Quantity shifts ########################
text(locator(1),expression(Q^0))
text(locator(1),expression(Q^a))
text(locator(1),expression(Q[n]^0))
text(locator(1),expression(Q[n]^a))
text(locator(1),expression(Q[r]^a))
text(locator(1),expression(Q[r]^0))
text(locator(1),expression(Q[i]^0))
text(locator(1),expression(Q[i]^a))
text(locator(1),expression(Q[G]^0))
#####################Step 1.8: Price shifts ###########################
text(locator(1),expression(d))
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text(locator(1),expression(P^a))
text(locator(1),expression(P^0))
####################Step 1.9: Shift indicating arrows##################
arrows(2.35,0.93, 2.31,1.01, code=2, lwd="1", length=0.05,angle=35 )
arrows(0.87,2.48, 0.8,2.58, code=2, lwd="1", length=0.05, angle=35 )
arrows(1.33, 2.01, 1.36,1.95, code=2, lwd="1", length=0.05, angle=35 )
arrows(1.63,1.56, 1.59,1.65, code=2, lwd="1", length=0.05,angle=35 )
arrows(0.658,0.143,
)
arrows(1.071,0.143,
)
arrows(1.491,0.143,
)
arrows(2.148,0.143,
)

0.549,0.143, code=2, lwd="1", length=0.05,angle=35
1.138,0.143, code=2, lwd="1", length=0.05,angle=35
1.416,0.143, code=2, lwd="1", length=0.05,angle=35
2.047,0.143, code=2, lwd="1", length=0.05,angle=35

# if you want to draw a box around your figure:
# box()
###2. R code for STOCHASTIC SIMULATION OF ECONOMIC SURPLUS CHANGES ####
##### STEP-0: Selecting the Source Codes and simulation iterations#####
source("C:/R directory/rtriangle.r")
NSim <- 10000

# Number of iterations for simulation

########################## STEP-2.1: DATA input########################
# Timber supply by different owners
QSW_indus<-6583
QSW_nipf<-76300
QSW_nonin<-25134
owners
QSW_gov<-10289
QHW_indus<-3813
QHW_nipf<-44198
QHW_nonin<-14559
owners
QHW_gov<-5525

# supply of softwood by industrial corporate owners
# supply of softwood by NIPF owners
# supply of softwood by nonindustrial corporate
# supply of softwood by government
# supply of hardwood by industrial corporate owners
# supply of hardtwood by NIPF owners
# supply of hardwood by nonindustrial corporate
# supply of hardwood by government

# Timber PRICE data
PSW_mmm<-cbind(50.19, 164.42, 419.67)
PHW_mmm<-cbind(74.46, 201.53, 454.75)

# softwood price
# hardwood price

PSW<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=PSW_mmm[1], mean=PSW_mmm[2], max=PSW_mmm[3])
PHW<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=PHW_mmm[1], mean=PHW_mmm[2], max=PHW_mmm[3])
# Inventory, supply and demand elasticities
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# Inventory
E_SW_indus_mmm<-cbind(0.525, 0.70, 0.875)
elasticity range for indutrial owners
E_SW_nipf_mmm<-cbind(0.563, 0.75, 0.938)
elasticity range for NIPF owners
E_SW_nonin_mmm<-cbind(0.45, 0.60, 0.75)
elasticity range for nonindustrial owners
E_SW_gov_mmm<-cbind(0, 0, 0)
elasticity range for Government
E_HW_indus_mmm<-cbind(0.923, 1.23, 1.538)
elasticity range for indutrial owners
E_HW_nipf_mmm<-cbind(0.75, 1.00, 1.25)
elasticity range for NIPF owners
E_HW_nonin_mmm<-cbind(0.75, 1.00, 1.25)
elasticity range for nonindustrial owners
E_HW_gov_mmm<-cbind(0, 0, 0)
elasticity range for Government

# softwood Inventory
# softwood Inventory
# softwood Inventory
# softwood Inventory

# hardwood Inventory
# hardwood Inventory
# hardwood Inventory
# hardwood Inventory

E_SW_indus<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=E_SW_indus_mmm[1],
mean=E_SW_indus_mmm[2], max=E_SW_indus_mmm[3])
E_SW_nipf<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=E_SW_nipf_mmm[1],
mean=E_SW_nipf_mmm[2], max=E_SW_nipf_mmm[3])
E_SW_nonin<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=E_SW_nonin_mmm[1],
mean=E_SW_nonin_mmm[2], max=E_SW_nonin_mmm[3])
E_SW_gov<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=E_SW_gov_mmm[1], mean=E_SW_gov_mmm[2],
max=E_SW_gov_mmm[3])
E_HW_indus<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=E_HW_indus_mmm[1],
mean=E_HW_indus_mmm[2], max=E_HW_indus_mmm[3])
E_HW_nipf<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=E_HW_nipf_mmm[1],
mean=E_HW_nipf_mmm[2], max=E_HW_nipf_mmm[3])
E_HW_nonin<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=E_HW_nonin_mmm[1],
mean=E_HW_nonin_mmm[2], max=E_HW_nonin_mmm[3])
E_HW_gov<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=E_HW_gov_mmm[1], mean=E_HW_gov_mmm[2],
max=E_HW_gov_mmm[3])
# Supply
S_SW_indus_mmm<-cbind(0.435, 0.58, 0.725)
range for indutrial owners
S_SW_nipf_mmm<-cbind(0.18, 0.24, 0.30)
range for NIPF owners
S_SW_nonis_mmm<-cbind(0.413, 0.55, 0.688)
range for noninduatrial owners
S_SW_gov_mmm<-cbind(0, 0, 0)
range for Government

# softwood Supply elasticity
# softwood Supply elasticity
# softwood Supply elasticity
# softwood Supply elasticity

S_HW_indus_mmm<-cbind(0.323, 0.43, 0.538)# hardwood Supply elasticity
range for indutrial owners
S_HW_nipf_mmm<-cbind(0.21, 0.28, 0.35)
# hardwood Supply elasticity
range for NIPF owners
S_HW_nonis_mmm<-cbind(0.30, 0.40, 0.50) # hardwood Supply elasticity
range for noninduatrial owners
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S_HW_gov_mmm<-cbind(0, 0, 0)
range for Government

# hardwood Supply elasticity

S_SW_indus<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=S_SW_indus_mmm[1],
mean=S_SW_indus_mmm[2], max=S_SW_indus_mmm[3])
S_SW_nipf<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=S_SW_nipf_mmm[1],
mean=S_SW_nipf_mmm[2], max=S_SW_nipf_mmm[3])
S_SW_nonin<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=S_SW_nonis_mmm[1],
mean=S_SW_nonis_mmm[2], max=S_SW_nonis_mmm[3])
S_SW_gov<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=S_SW_gov_mmm[1], mean=S_SW_gov_mmm[2],
max=S_SW_gov_mmm[3])
S_HW_indus<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=S_HW_indus_mmm[1],
mean=S_HW_indus_mmm[2], max=S_HW_indus_mmm[3])
S_HW_nipf<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=S_HW_nipf_mmm[1],
mean=S_HW_nipf_mmm[2], max=S_HW_nipf_mmm[3])
S_HW_nonin<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=S_HW_nonis_mmm[1],
mean=S_HW_nonis_mmm[2], max=S_HW_nonis_mmm[3])
S_HW_gov<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=S_HW_gov_mmm[1], mean=S_HW_gov_mmm[2],
max=S_HW_gov_mmm[3])
# Demand
N_SW_mmm<-cbind(0.338, 0.45, 0.563) # softwood Demand elasticity
(values should be negative)
N_HW_mmm<-cbind(0.18, 0.24, 0.30) # hardwood Demand elasticity (values
should be negative)
N_SW<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=N_SW_mmm[1], mean=N_SW_mmm[2],
max=N_SW_mmm[3])
N_HW<-rtriangle(n=NSim, min=N_HW_mmm[1], mean=N_HW_mmm[2],
max=N_HW_mmm[3])
# Supply share for owners
Lambda_SW_indus<-0.06; Lambda_SW_nipf<-0.64; Lambda_SW_nonin<-0.21;
Lambda_SW_gov<-0.09
Lambda_HW_indus<-0.06; Lambda_HW_nipf<-0.65; Lambda_HW_nonin<-0.21;
Lambda_HW_gov<-0.08
# Land share for owners
l_SW_indus<-0.04; l_SW_nipf<-0.49; l_SW_nonin<-0.16; l_SW_gov<-0.30
l_HW_indus<-0.04; l_HW_nipf<-0.49; l_HW_nonin<-0.16; l_HW_gov<-0.30
# Land base change rate
#For total
dL_SW_indus<-(-0.6873); dL_SW_nipf<-(-0.1007); dL_SW_nonin<-(0.4802)
dL_HW_indus<-(-0.6873); dL_HW_nipf<-(-0.1007); dL_HW_nonin<-(0.4802)
#For annual (Rstart Tinn R and activate following two lines)
#dL_SW_indus<-(-0.0344); dL_SW_nipf<-(-0.0050); dL_SW_nonin<-(0.0239)
#dL_HW_indus<-(-0.0344); dL_HW_nipf<-(-0.0050); dL_HW_nonin<-(0.0239)
################### STEP-2.2: DISPLACEMENT calculations################
# Price displacement rate
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# Softwood price displacement rate
dPSW<((Lambda_SW_indus*E_SW_indus*dL_SW_indus)+(Lambda_SW_nipf*E_SW_nipf*dL_
SW_nipf)(Lambda_SW_nonin*E_SW_nonin*(((dL_SW_indus*l_SW_indus)+(dL_SW_nipf*l_SW
_nipf))/l_SW_nonin)))/(-N_SW-(Lambda_SW_indus*S_SW_indus)(Lambda_SW_nipf*S_SW_nipf)-(Lambda_SW_nonin*S_SW_nonin))
# Hardwood price displacement rate
dPHW<((Lambda_HW_indus*E_HW_indus*dL_HW_indus)+(Lambda_HW_nipf*E_HW_nipf*dL_
HW_nipf)(Lambda_HW_nonin*E_HW_nonin*(((dL_HW_indus*l_HW_indus)+(dL_HW_nipf*l_HW
_nipf))/l_HW_nonin)))/(-N_HW-(Lambda_HW_indus*S_HW_indus)(Lambda_HW_nipf*S_HW_nipf)-(Lambda_HW_nonin*S_HW_nonin))
# %Price change table (X1=SW price change %, X2=HW price change %)
Pricechangerate<-data.frame(cbind(mean(dPSW)*100, mean(dPHW)*100))
# Displaced Price
PSW_a<-PSW*(1+dPSW);
PHW_a<-PHW*(1+dPHW)

# for softwood
# for softwood

# Quantity displacement
dQSW_indus<-(S_SW_indus*dPSW)+(E_SW_indus*dL_SW_indus)
dQSW_nipf<-(S_SW_nipf*dPSW)+(E_SW_nipf*dL_SW_nipf)
dQSW_nonin<-(S_SW_nonin*dPSW)+(E_SW_nonin*dL_SW_nonin)
dQSW_gov<-0
dQSW_overal<-(-N_SW)*dPSW
dQ_SW_OVERAL
dQHW_indus<-(S_HW_indus*dPHW)+(E_HW_indus*dL_HW_indus)
dQHW_nipf<-(S_HW_nipf*dPHW)+(E_HW_nipf*dL_HW_nipf)
dQHW_nonin<-(S_HW_nonin*dPHW)+(E_HW_nonin*dL_HW_nonin)
dQHW_gov<-0
dQHW_overal<-(-N_HW)*dPHW
dQ_HW_OVERAL

#
#
#
#
#

dQ_SW_indus
dQ_SW_nipf
dQ_SW_nonin
dQ_SW_gov

#
#
#
#
#

dQ_HW_indus
dQ_HW_nipf
dQ_HW_nonin
dQ_HW_gov

# % Quanitity chnage table
(Quantitychangerate<data.frame(cbind(mean(dQSW_gov)*100,mean(dQSW_indus)*100,mean(dQSW_noni
n)*100,mean(dQSW_nipf)*100, mean(dQSW_overal)*100,
mean(dQHW_gov)*100,mean(dQHW_indus)*100,mean(dQHW_nonin)*100,mean(dQHW_
nipf)*100, mean(dQHW_overal)*100)))
# Vertical shift in supply
# Softwood shift
dVSW<((Lambda_SW_indus*E_SW_indus*dL_SW_indus)+(Lambda_SW_nipf*E_SW_nipf*dL_
SW_nipf)(Lambda_SW_nonin*E_SW_nonin*(((dL_SW_indus*l_SW_indus)+(dL_SW_nipf*l_SW
_nipf))/l_SW_nonin)))/(-(Lambda_SW_indus*S_SW_indus)(Lambda_SW_nipf*S_SW_nipf)-(Lambda_SW_nonin*S_SW_nonin))
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# Hardwood shift
dVHW<((Lambda_HW_indus*E_HW_indus*dL_HW_indus)+(Lambda_HW_nipf*E_HW_nipf*dL_
HW_nipf)(Lambda_HW_nonin*E_HW_nonin*(((dL_HW_indus*l_HW_indus)+(dL_HW_nipf*l_HW
_nipf))/l_HW_nonin)))/(-(Lambda_HW_indus*S_HW_indus)(Lambda_HW_nipf*S_HW_nipf)-(Lambda_HW_nonin*S_HW_nonin))
#################### STEP-2.3: WELFARE calculations###################
# Producer surplus change in softwood market
dPS_SW_indus<-(PSW*QSW_indus*(1+ 0.5*dQSW_indus)*(dPSW-dVSW))/1000
dPS_SW_nipf<-(PSW*QSW_nipf*(1+ 0.5*dQSW_nipf)*(dPSW-dVSW))/1000
dPS_SW_nonin<-(PSW*QSW_nonin*(1+ 0.5*dQSW_nonin)*(dPSW+dVSW))/1000
dPS_SW_gov<-((PSW_a-PSW)*QSW_gov)/1000
dPS_SW_all<-( dPS_SW_indus + dPS_SW_nipf + dPS_SW_nonin + dPS_SW_gov)
# Producer surplus change in hardwood market
dPS_HW_indus<-(PHW*QHW_indus*(1+ 0.5*dQHW_indus)*(dPHW-dVHW))/1000
dPS_HW_nipf<-(PHW*QHW_nipf*(1+ 0.5*dQHW_nipf)*(dPHW-dVHW))/1000
dPS_HW_nonin<-(PHW*QHW_nonin*(1+ 0.5*dQHW_nonin)*(dPHW+dVHW))/1000
dPS_HW_gov<-((PHW_a-PHW)*QHW_gov)/1000
dPS_HW_all<-( dPS_HW_indus + dPS_HW_nipf + dPS_HW_nonin + dPS_HW_gov)
# Producer surplus change in both markets combined
dPS_bothmarket_indus<-(dPS_SW_indus+dPS_HW_indus)
dPS_bothmarket_nipf<-(dPS_SW_nipf+dPS_HW_nipf)
dPS_bothmarket_nonin<-(dPS_SW_nonin+dPS_HW_nonin)
dPS_bothmarket_gov<-(dPS_SW_gov+dPS_HW_gov)
dPS_bothmarket_all<-(dPS_SW_all+dPS_HW_all)
# Consumer surplus change
dCS_SW<-((PSW*(QSW_indus+QSW_nipf+QSW_nonin+QSW_gov)*dPSW*(1+0.5*dQSW_overal)))/
1000
dCS_HW<-((PHW*(QHW_indus+QHW_nipf+QHW_nonin+QHW_gov)*dPHW*(1+0.5*dQHW_overal)))/
1000
dCS_bothmarket<-(dCS_SW+dCS_HW)
# Total surplus change
dTS_SW_all<- (dPS_SW_all+dCS_SW)
dTS_HW_all<- (dPS_HW_all+dCS_HW)
dTS_bothmarket_all<- (dPS_bothmarket_all+dCS_bothmarket)
# Surplus outputs/results
(result.dps<-data.frame(cbind(mean(dPS_SW_gov), mean(dPS_SW_indus),
mean(dPS_SW_nonin),mean(dPS_SW_nipf), mean(dPS_SW_all), mean(dCS_SW),
mean(dTS_SW_all) )))
(result.dps<-data.frame(cbind(mean(dPS_HW_gov), mean(dPS_HW_indus),
mean(dPS_HW_nonin),mean(dPS_HW_nipf), mean(dPS_HW_all), mean(dCS_HW),
mean(dTS_HW_all) )))
(result.dps<-data.frame(cbind(mean(dPS_bothmarket_gov),
mean(dPS_bothmarket_indus),
mean(dPS_bothmarket_nonin),mean(dPS_bothmarket_nipf),
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mean(dPS_bothmarket_all), mean(dCS_bothmarket),
mean(dTS_bothmarket_all) )))
################# STEP-2.4: Derivation of cdf/95%CI###################
#

For producer surplus change

# Probability parcentile for cdf
probs <- seq(0.0, 1.0, 0.05)
# Softwood market
# Industrial corporate owners
cdf1 <- c(quantile(dPS_SW_indus,prob=probs))
# NIPF landowners
cdf2 <- c(quantile(dPS_SW_nipf,prob=probs))
#Nonindustrial corporate owners
cdf3 <- c(quantile(dPS_SW_nonin,prob=probs))
# Government
cdf4 <- c(quantile(dPS_SW_gov,prob=probs))
# Hardwood market
#Industrial corporate owners
cdf5 <- c(quantile(dPS_HW_indus,prob=probs))
#NIPF landowners
cdf6 <- c(quantile(dPS_HW_nipf,prob=probs))
#Nonindustrial corporate owners
cdf7 <- c(quantile(dPS_HW_nonin,prob=probs))
#Government
cdf8 <- c(quantile(dPS_HW_gov,prob=probs))
#All owners combined
# Softwood market
cdf9 <- c(quantile(dPS_SW_all,prob=probs))
# Hardwood market
cdf10 <- c(quantile(dPS_HW_all,prob=probs))
# Both markets combined
cdf11 <- c(quantile(dPS_bothmarket_all,prob=probs))
# Producer surplus change for both markets combined
# Iindustrial owners
cdf12 <- c(quantile(dPS_bothmarket_indus,prob=probs))
# NIPF owners
cdf13 <- c(quantile(dPS_bothmarket_nipf,prob=probs))
#Nonindustrial owners
cdf14 <- c(quantile(dPS_bothmarket_nonin,prob=probs))
# For governemnt
cdf15 <- c(quantile(dPS_bothmarket_gov,prob=probs))
# For consumer surplus change
# Softwood market
cdf16 <- c(quantile(dCS_SW,prob=probs))
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# Hardwood market
cdf17 <- c(quantile(dCS_HW,prob=probs))
# Both markets combined
cdf18 <- c(quantile(dCS_bothmarket,prob=probs))
# Total Surplus Change
# In softwood market
cdf19 <- c(quantile(dTS_SW_all,prob=probs))
# In hardwood market
cdf20 <- c(quantile(dTS_HW_all,prob=probs))
# In both markets
cdf21 <- c(quantile(dTS_bothmarket_all,prob=probs))
# 95% CI outputs
(cdf_results<- data.frame(cbind(cdf1, cdf2, cdf3, cdf4, cdf5, cdf6,
cdf7, cdf8, cdf9, cdf10, cdf11,
cdf12, cdf13, cdf14, cdf15, cdf16, cdf17, cdf18, cdf19, cdf20, cdf21
)))
######## STEP-2.5: Derivation of pdf_95%CI_ figure 4.2 & 4.3 #########
# PDF's for producer surplus
# Softwood market
# Defining arrangement of pdfs
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
bringToTop(stay=TRUE)
# Producer surplus for industrial corporate owners
# maxval <- rbind(max(dPS_SW_indus))
# minval <- rbind(min(dPS_SW_indus))
# 95% CI is used in x; maxval and min val may also be used as arguments
of x
mean1<-mean(dPS_SW_indus)
x <- seq(-78, -5, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean1, sd=5)
pdf1<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "Industrial
corporate landowners",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
# Producer surplus for NIPF landowners
mean2<-mean(dPS_SW_nipf)
x <- seq(-1138, -67, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean2, sd=15)
pdf2<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "NIPF
landowners",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
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# Producer surplus for nonindustrial corporate owners
mean3<-mean(dPS_SW_nonin)
x <- seq(62, 1030, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean3, sd=20)
pdf3<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "Nonindustrial
corporate landowners",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
# Producer surplus for government
mean4<-mean(dPS_SW_gov)
minval <- rbind(min(dPS_SW_gov))
x <- seq(6, 106, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean4, sd=5)
pdf4<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "Public
ownership",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
# Hardwood market
# Producer surplus for industrial corporate owners
mean5<-mean(dPS_HW_indus)
x <- seq(-34, 5, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean5, sd=2)
pdf5<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "Industrial
corporate landowners",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
# Producer surplus for NIPF landowners
mean6<-mean(dPS_HW_nipf)
x <- seq(-678, 98, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean6, sd=20)
pdf6<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "NIPF
landowners",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
# Producer surplus for nonindustrial corporate owners
mean7<-mean(dPS_HW_nonin)
x <- seq(-148, 975, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean7, sd=15)
pdf7<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "Nonindustrial
corporate landowners",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
# Producer surplus for government
mean8<-mean(dPS_HW_gov)
x <- seq(-16, 106, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean8, sd=5)
pdf8<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "Public
Ownership",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
# Producer surplus change for all owners combined
# Softwood market
mean9<-mean(dPS_SW_all)
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x <- seq(-130, 43, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean9, sd=10)
pdf9<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "Softwood
market",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
# Hardwood market
mean10<-mean(dPS_HW_all)
x <- seq(-59, 386, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean10, sd=10)
pdf10<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "Hardwood
market",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
# Both markets combined
mean11<-mean(dPS_bothmarket_all)
x <- seq(-112, 369, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean11, sd=20)
pdf11<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "Total
producer surplus change",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
# Producer surplus change for both markets combined
# For industrial owners
mean12<-mean(dPS_bothmarket_indus)
x <- seq(-94, -10, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean12, sd=5)
pdf12<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "Industrial
corporate owners",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
# For NIPF owners
mean13<-mean(dPS_bothmarket_nipf)
x <- seq(-1472, -160, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean13, sd=20)
pdf13<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "NIPF owners",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
# For nonindustrial owners
mean14<-mean(dPS_bothmarket_nonin)
x <- seq(137, 1607, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean14, sd=20)
pdf14<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "Nonindustrial
corporate owners",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
# For governemnt
mean15<-mean(dPS_bothmarket_gov)
x <- seq(14, 171, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean15, sd=5)
pdf15<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "Public
ownership",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
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# PDF's for consumer surplus
# Softwood market
mean16 <- mean(dCS_SW)
x <- seq(-1210, -71, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean16, sd=15)
pdf16<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "Sofwood
market",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
# Hardwood market
mean17 <- mean(dCS_HW)
minval <- rbind(min(dCS_HW))
x <- seq(-1300, 193, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean17, sd=15)
pdf17<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "Hardwood
market",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
# Both market
mean18<-mean(dCS_bothmarket)
x <- seq(-2019, -145, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean18, sd=20)
pdf18<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "Total
consumer surplus change",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
#

PDFs for Total Surplus Change

# In softwood market
mean19<-mean(dTS_SW_all)
x <- seq(-1282, -75, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean19, sd=15)
pdf19<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "Softwood
market",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
# In hardwood market
mean20<-mean(dTS_HW_all)
x <- seq(-932, 133, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean20, sd=20)
pdf20<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "Hardwood
market",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
# In both markets
mean21<-mean(dTS_bothmarket_all)
x <- seq(-1772, -175, length=10000)
y <- dnorm(x, mean21, sd=25)
pdf21<-plot(x,y, type="l", lty=1, family="serif", main = "Total social
welfare change",
xlab="Million Dollars", ylab="Density")
#############STEP-2.6: Source Code for stochastic simulation##########
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rtriangle <- function(n=1, min=0, mean=0.5, max=1, seed=NULL)
{
# set seed if required
if (!is.null(seed)) set.seed(seed)
# test valid parameters
if ( any( diff( c(min, mean, max) )

< 0) )

{
print("Invalid parameters")
return(NULL)
exit
} else
{
if (min == max)
{
Y = rep(mean, n)
} else
{
U <- runif(n)
t0 <- (mean - min) /(max - min)
X <- sqrt(U * t0 )
X[U > t0] <- 1 - sqrt( ( 1 - U[U > t0] ) * (1 - t0) )
Y <- min + (max - min) * X
}
return(Y)
}
}
#ENDENDENDENDENDENDENDENDENDENDENDENDENDENDENDENDENDENDENDENDENDENDEND#
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